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The prosecution service is a key role player in the criminal justice system. Its 
effectiveness and efficiency directly reflect on the performance and service of 
the whole criminal justice system. The South African prosecution service in its 
current shape is relatively young. Constitutional and legislative provisions 
supplemented by various policy papers have established a framework that in 
principle allows for an effective and efficient function of the prosecution 
service in the South African criminal justice system. However, the actual 
performance of the prosecution service is insufficient, as this thesis suggests. 
Reasons for the current underperformance can be identified and are strongly 
linked to the transitional development of the South African prosecution service. 
In order to increase the performance of the prosecution service and the service 
of the criminal justice system this thesis explores the challenges facing the 
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The South African Prosecution Service: Linchpin of the South 
African Criminal Justice System? 
 
I. Introduction 
South Africa is still afflicted with high levels of crime.
1
 A recently submitted 
report of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) lists what it sees as the 
15 key threats to the stability of South Africa’s democracy.
2
 Apart from threats 
such as unemployment, poverty and the huge gap between rich and poor, the 
high levels of crime, especially violent crime and crimes against women and 
children, are highlighted. The South African government is ‘urged’ to make the 
fight against crime its ‘top priority’.
3
 Despite all the efforts the South African 
government has undertaken in the last decade, it seems that new ideas and 
approaches are required and existing measure have to be intensified. Although 
combating crime is a national task that requires the exertion of all institutions 
and members of the South African society, such as state departments and 
agencies, non-governmental organisations and the civil society, it poses the 
question whether the South African criminal justice system is effectively and 
efficiently addressing crime. The high crime levels place an immense burden 
on the South African criminal justice system and every single role player in it.  
In South Africa, just as in most countries of the world, the criminal justice 
system is based on three major pillars: the police, the prosecution service and 
the courts, and the prison system.
4
 The prosecution service – as part of the 
second pillar – has a huge importance for the successful operation of the 
criminal justice system. Even proper and sound investigation by the police, for 
example, will not lead to a conviction when the prosecution fails to present the 
evidence properly at court. The prison system also relies heavily on 
                                                
1
 Recent developments in South Africa’s crime statistics are discussed by Louw, A. ‘South 




 Burger, J. ‘Fight Crime, Africa tells South Africa – Brendan Boyle, Sunday Times, 3 
December 2006’ (2006) ISS Today, available at: 
http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=14&slink_id=3942&link_type=12&slink_type=12
&tmpl_id=3, accessed: 04.01.2007.     
3
 Ibid. 
4 Schönteich, M. ‘Lawyers for the people: The South African Prosecution Service’ (2001) ISS 
Monograph No 53, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, p. 15.         
 8 
prosecutorial work. On the one hand, only successful convictions will get 
criminals in the care of the correctional service.
5
 On the other hand, a too strict 
prosecution policy can easily overfill the prisons and turn prison conditions to 
the worse.       
High workloads within criminal justice systems are not a particular South 
African problem, although the pressure might be here – compared to other 
countries – higher. It seems to be a general feature of modern criminal justice 
systems that the prosecution service gains more importance, especially in 
relieving justice systems from their overload.
6
 In South Africa where resources 
in the criminal justice system are quite limited this aspect is of particular 
importance.  
The aim of this thesis is therefore to explore whether the South African 
prosecution service is currently able to cope with the high pressure it is facing 
and, based on that, to identify its future challenges. 
 
In order to achieve this aim the thesis, firstly, analyses how the prosecution 
service has evolved and is shaped by the South African Constitution
7
 and the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act
8
 in its organisation and work. It is also 
considered how these provisions are supplemented by prosecution and state 
policy papers. 
Secondly, the thesis assesses with regard to several indicators the performance 
of the prosecution service. Thirdly, with regard to the transitional development 
reasons for the currently achieved performance are identified.   
Finally, based on the findings of this thesis the major challenges facing the 
South African prosecution service in improving its performance and the service 
of the criminal justice system are determined and discussed. 
  
                                                
5
 Of course, the final decision whether a person will be convicted or not rests with the courts.  
6
 Discussed in the European context by Jehle, J.-M. and Wade, M. (eds.) Coping with 
Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems – The Rise of Prosecutorial Power Across Europe (2006) 
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.  
7
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, hereinafter referred to as the South 
African Constitution.  
8 National Prosecuting Authority Act No 32 of 1998, hereinafter referred to as the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act. 
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II. Historic evolution of the South African Prosecution Service  
The South African prosecution service in its current form – shaped by the 
South African Constitution and the National Prosecuting Authority Act – is 
relatively young. The historical evolution of the South African prosecution 
service can be traced back to the arrival of the first Europeans at the Cape.
9
 
Issues surrounding the introduction of a single national prosecuting authority 
and accompanying constitutional and legislative provisions might only be 
comprehensible against the backdrop of the more recent history of the 
prosecution service. For example, the degree of independence the prosecution 
service enjoys today cannot be measured entirely without taking previous 
arrangements into account.  
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century – after the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-
1902) the four territories that later became the Union of South Africa had 
attorneys-general who prosecuted criminals in the name of the English 
Crown.
10
 As elected members of the colonial cabinets they were directly 
accountable to the electorate and therefore there was the obvious risk that their 
work would be influenced by their desire to be re-elected.
11
  
In 1910, when the Union of South Africa was formed, the post of Minister of 
Justice was created in the national cabinet.
12
 In each provincial division of the 
newly established union-wide Supreme Court, an attorney-general was 
appointed with the authority to prosecute.
13
 Each attorney-general prosecuted 
on behalf of the state or delegated his authority – at the lower level – to police 
officers and – in the Supreme Court – to trial advocates in private practice.
14
 
The attorneys-general were independent civil servants, responsible for all 
prosecutions that took place in their area of jurisdiction and legally free from 
ministerial constraint and parliamentary responsibility.
15
  
                                                
9 Schönteich, M. ’Court Room Warriors for Justice: History of the South African Prosecution 
Service’ (2002) Journal for Contemporary History Vol. 27, Issue 3, 82-104, p. 82; Schönteich 
op cit (note 4), p. 27.         
10
 Van Zyl Smit, D. and Steyn, E. ‘Prosecuting Authority in the New South Africa’ Centre for 




 South Africa Act 1909, section 139.   
13
 South Africa Act 1909, section 139; Criminal Procedure Act No 31 of 1917, section 7.  
14 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), pp. 138 f. 
15
 Ibid, p. 139. 
 10 
Concern about the far reaching powers of the attorneys-general and their 
independence and freedom from political control led to an amendment of the 
Criminal Procedure Act in 1926.
16
 A previous dispute between the Minister of 
Justice and an attorney-general who refused to prosecute in a particular matter 
as the Minister had instructed him had been the final catalyst.
17
 The amended 
Act gave the Minister of Justice ‘all powers, authorities and functions relating 
to the prosecution of crimes and offences.’
18
 As a result the attorneys-general 
lost all their independence; their authority to prosecute had to be assigned to 
them by the Minister of Justice.
19
 With this provision it was sought to 
guarantee parliamentary responsibility for prosecutorial decisions.
20
  
Two attorneys-general resigned to protest against this legislation.
21
 
Additionally, after some time the 1926 legislation proved that it had imposed a 
very high managerial and administrative burden on the Minister of Justice.
22
 
Therefore, in 1935, the power of prosecution was relocated to the attorneys-
general, but subject to the control of the Minister of Justice.
23
 The Minister was 
entitled to issue directions to attorneys-general to exercise their powers directly 
in any specific matter and reverse any decision arrived by an attorney-
general.
24
 These provisions remained in their essence valid until the early 
1990s
25
 with the result that until that time there was no formal or substantive 
separation of powers between an attorney-general and the executive. Direct and 
indirect political influence was possible.
26
 Moreover, attorneys-general and 
their staff were civil servants which impacted also negatively on their 
independence, as this subjected them to ultimate ministerial control.
27
 
                                                
16 Schönteich op cit (note 4), pp. 31 f. 
17 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 139. 
18
 Criminal and Magistrate’s Court Procedure (amendment) Act No 39 of 1926, section 1(3).  
19
 Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 32. 
20 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 140. 
21 Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 32. 
22
 Bekker, P. M. ‘National or Super Attorney-General: Political Subjectivity or Juridical 
Objectivity?’ (1995) Consultus Vol. 8, Issue 1, 27-31, p. 27.    
23
 Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 32. 
24 General Law Amendment Act No 46 of 1935, section 1 repealed the 1926 amendment of 
section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act No 31 of 1917. 
25
 Criminal Procedure Act No 56 of 1955, section 5(3); Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, 
section 3(5).  
26 D’Oliveira, J. A. ‘The office of the Attorney-General’ (1993) Nuntius Vol. 23, 70 f, p. 70.  
27
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 141.  
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Although anecdotal evidence suggests that ministerial interference hardly ever 
happened, the legal provisions allowing it were strongly criticised.
28
                          
In 1992, legislation was passed that complied with the critique and removed 
attorneys-general from the control of the Public Service Commission and 
entrenched the non-interference of the Minister of Justice.
29
 The authority to 
institute prosecutions became the sole responsibility of the attorneys-general 





 and security of tenure of office
32
 enhanced the independence of 
the attorneys-general. The function of the Minister of Justice was reduced to 
that of a coordinator:  
‘to ensure that the reports of the attorneys-general were submitted to 
Parliament. At most he could request an attorney-general to furnish him 





The Attorney-General Act No 92 of 1992 strengthened the authority of the 
provincial prosecutors and made the attorney-general in each province 
independent of the executive.  
‘They were accountable only to Parliament and then only in the limited 




South Africa’s new ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC) viewed 
this Act with suspicion, as an attempt by the old regime to protect the 
entrenched position of the incumbent attorneys-general.
35
 Some of the 
attorneys-general played a significant role in the aggressive prosecutions of 
political cases during the apartheid era.
36
 Therefore the 1996 Constitution 
                                                
28
 Critique mentioned, for example, in: D’Oliveira op cit (note 26), p. 70; Schönteich op cit 
(note 4), p. 33. 
29 Attorney-General Act No 92 of 1992. 
30
 The Attorney-General Act No 92 of 1992 repealed section 3(5) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977 whereby the Minister of Justice could reverse any decision arrived at by an 
attorney-general.  
31 The salary of an attorney-general should not longer be reduced by the hands of the executive, 
only an act of parliament could do so (Attorney-General Act No of 1992, section 3(1)(b)). 
32
 Attorney-General Act No 92 of 1992, section 4.  
33
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 142; compare Attorney-General Act No 92 of 1992, 
section 5(5). 
34
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 142. 
35
 Ibid, p. 143. 
36
 Stone, Christopher, America, Cheslan, Braid, Michelle India and the Staff of the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance and the Vera Institute of Justice Prosecutors in the Frontline: Increasing the 
Effectiveness of Criminal Justice in South Africa (2003), p. 8. 
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ended the brief period of autonomy by a firm integration of the prosecution 
service with the rest of the criminal justice system.  
   
III. Constitutional and legislative framework  
The prosecution service in its current form is shaped by the South African 
Constitution and the National Prosecuting Authority Act.  
 
1. The South African Constitution 
The South African Constitution deals in terms of section 179 specifically with 
the prosecuting authority for South Africa. Important features are:     
The introduction of a single national prosecuting authority in South Africa, 
structured in terms of an Act of Parliament.
37
 The National Prosecuting 
Authority is headed by a national director of public prosecutions who is 
appointed by the President and consists furthermore of directors of public 
prosecutions and prosecutors.
38
 The prosecuting authority has the power to 
institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state.
39
 National legislation has 




The National Director must determine, with the concurrence of the Minister of 
Justice, and after consultation with the Directors of Public Prosecutions, 
prosecution policy that has to be observed in the prosecuting process.
41
 
Additionally, the National Director has to issue policy directives to be observed 
in the prosecution process,
42
 and has the right to intervene in the prosecution 
process when policy directives are not complied with.
43
 Finally, the National 
Director is entitled to review a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, after 
                                                
37
 Section 179(1). 
38
 Section 179(1)(a), (b). 
39 Section 179(2). 
40
 Section 179(4).  
41
 Section 179(5)(a). 
42
 Section 179(5)(b).  
43 Section 179(5)(c). 
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consulting with the relevant directors of public prosecutions.
44
 The Minister of 
Justice must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting authority.
45
     
 
2. Issues surrounding the constitutional provisions           
The constitutional provision dealing with the prosecuting authority was highly 
controversial and its constitutionality was challenged immediately.
46
 The 
newly established Constitutional Court had been empowered by the 1993 
interim Constitution
47
 to test whether the ‘final’ Constitution complied with 
constitutional principles. These principles had been added as a schedule
48
 to the 
interim Constitution and - in accordance with a majority rule – had to be met 
by the final Constitution.
49
 It was argued that section 179 infringed the 
principle of separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary.
50
 The objection was based primarily on the fact that in terms of 
section 179(1) the National Director of Public Prosecutions is appointed by the 
President as head of the national executive.
51
  
The Constitutional Court rejected this objection and held that the prosecuting 
authority was not part of the judiciary and that Constitutional Principle VI had 
no application to it.
52
 In any event the appointment of the National Director of 
Prosecutions by the President did not in itself contravene the doctrine of the 
separations of powers. Moreover, the court noted that section 179(4), which 
provided that an Act of Parliament had to ensure that the prosecuting authority 
‘exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice,’ was a constitutional 
guarantee of prosecutorial independence.
53
               
 
                                                
44
 Section 179(5)(d). 
45 Section 179(6). 
46
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 144. 
47
 Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No 200 of 1993, hereinafter 
referred to as the interim Constitution. 
48 Schedule 4. 
49
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 144.  
50
 Schedule 4, Constitutional Principle VI:  
‘There shall be a separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judiciary 
with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.’   
51
 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, in re certification of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), at 818 para 141. 
52 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid, at 819 para 146. 
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3. The National Prosecuting Authority Act  
Section 179 of the South African Constitution requires that national legislation 
stipulates the details of the new prosecutorial system for South Africa. In 1998 
Parliament fulfilled this constitutional requirement and passed the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act.  
The Act determines the structure and composition of the new established 
centralised National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).
54
 Furthermore, it provides 
for the appointment, remuneration and conditions of service of the NPA 
members
55
 and determines their powers, duties and functions.
56
 While section 7 
provides for investigating directorates, the powers, duties and functions 
relating to them are determined in chapter five. Chapter six of the NPA Act 
deals with general provisions, such as the impartiality of prosecutors, the 
Minister’s final responsibility over the prosecuting authority and the 
accountability of the NPA to Parliament, including the duty of annual 
submitted reports. Chapter six also includes provisions regarding expenditure 
and administrative staff of the NPA, and other regulations, such as the non 
liability of prosecutors who performed in good faith under the Act.            
The last chapter of the NPA Act deals with transitional arrangements following 
the Act, such as the application of the Act to prosecutors who had already been 
appointed under the previous legislation or to criminal proceedings which had 
been instituted before the commencement of the NPA Act.  
In 2001 the National Prosecuting Authority Act was amended
57
 and the 
Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) was formally
58
 established as an 




                                                
54
 Chapter 2. 
55
 Chapter 3. 
56
 Chapter 4.  
57 The National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act No 61 of 2000 came into operation in 
January 2001.  
58
 The Directorate of Special Operations – colloquially referred to as the Scorpions – was 
launched in September 1999 in Guguletu near Cape Town (Redpath, J. ‘The Scorpions – 
Analysing the Directorate of Special Operations’ (2004) ISS Monograph No 96, Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, p. 12).  
 15 
a) Structure of the NPA 
The NPA consists of the office of a national director, and the offices of the 
prosecuting authority at the high courts.
59
 The office of the National Director 
consists of the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) who is the 
head of the office
60
 and up to four deputy national directors of public 
prosecution (DNDPPs).
61
 At the discretion of the National Director, any of the 
Deputy National Directors may exercise or perform any of the powers, duties 
and functions of the National Director.
62
 Currently there are deputy national 
director posts in existence for the following NPA components: 
 
aa) National Prosecution Service (NPS)               
The offices of the National Prosecution Service at the seat of each of the nine 
divisions of the high court in South Africa and the Witwatersrand local division 
of the high court fall under the control of a deputy national director. Every 
office is headed by a director of public prosecutions (DPP) or deputy director 
of public prosecutions (DDPP).
63
 Offices are staffed by one or more deputy 
directors of public prosecutions, state advocates, prosecutors and 
administrative staff.
64
 The head of the office supervises, directs and co-
ordinates the work and activities of all deputy directors, state advocates, chief 
prosecutors and prosecutors attached to the office.
65
        
 
bb) Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) 
The Directorate of Special Operations has the aim to investigate and carry out 
any functions incidental to investigations; to gather, keep and analyse crime 
information; and to institute criminal proceedings and carry out any necessary 
functions incidental to criminal proceedings relating to offences or any 
                                                
59
 NPA Act, section 3. 
60
 Ibid, section 5(2)(a). 
61 Ibid, section 5(2)(b); NPA Act No 32 of 1998, as amended, section 11(1).   
62
 Ibid, section 23. 
63
 Ibid, section 13(1)(a): Directors of public prosecutions are appointed by the President after 
consultation with the Minister of Justice and the National Director of Public Prosecutions. 
64 Ibid, section 6(2). 
65
 Ibid, section 24(1)(b).  
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criminal or unlawful activities committed in an organised fashion, or such other 
offences or categories of offences as determined by the President.
66
   
The head of the Directorate of Special Operations is also a deputy national 
director.
67
 The directorate is staffed by investigating directors, deputy directors, 
special investigators, prosecutors, and persons necessary in achieving its 
objectives.
68
       
 
cc) Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) 
The Asset Forfeiture Unit implements the asset forfeiture provisions in 
Chapters five and six of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act No 121 of 
1998 (POCA).
69
 The head of the unit is again a deputy national director.    
 
dd) National Special Services Division (NSSD) 
The head of the National Special Services Division is also a deputy national 
director. The division comprises the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU), 
the Specialised Commercial Crime Unit (SCCU), the Sexual Offences and 
Community Affairs (SOCA) Unit and the Witness Protection Unit (WPU).
70
 
Every unit is headed by a special director. Special directors are directors of 
public prosecutions who have specific powers, functions and duties assigned to 
them.
71
     
 
ee) Corporate Service (CS) Division 
The Corporate Services Division provides the NPA and its several components 
with a wide range of administrative, managerial and support services.
72
 For 
example, the Corporate Services Division has developed a strategy for the NPA 
                                                
66
 Ibid, section 7(1)(a), as amended.  
67
 Ibid, section 7(3)(a), as amended. 
68 Ibid, section 7(4)(a), as amended.  
69
 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Annual Report 2005/2006 (2006), p. 28; 
hereinafter referred to as the NPA Annual Report 2005/06. 
70
 NPA Annual Report 2005/06, p. 60. 
71 NPA Act, section 13(1)(c).  
72
 NPA Annual Report 2005/06, pp. 7 ff, 54 ff. 
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and its components covering the years till 2020 with regard to governance, 
delivery and resourcing.
73
   
 
b) Single provisions of the NPA Act  
aa) Powers of the National Director 
The National Director of Public Prosecutions has complete authority over all 
prosecutions and members of the prosecution service.
74
 He must,  
‘with the concurrence of the Minister of Justice, and after consulting the 
directors of public prosecutions, determine prosecuting policy and issue 






 it is argued that the precise wording of this provision is 
important. The ‘concurrence’ of the Minister means that the National Director 
requires his approval, in other words the Minister can veto policy proposals 
made by the National Director.
77
 Conversely, ‘after consultation’ means that 
the National Director can go ahead and ignore the input of the Directors of 
Public Prosecutions if he disagrees with it.
78
        
The National Director also has the power to intervene in any prosecution 
process when policy directives are not complied with.
79
 Closely connected to 
this is his power to review a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, after 
consulting the relevant director of public prosecutions, and after hearing 
representations from the accused person, the complainant and any other person 
deemed relevant.
80
 Although this latter power appears to exist even where 
policy directives are being followed, it is limited to review decisions on 
whether to prosecute or not and would not include a direct intervention in the 
way a case is presented in court, for example.
81
        
 
                                                
73
 NPA Annual Report 2005/06, p. 11 (Strategy 2020). 
74
 Ibid, section 22(1).  
75
 Ibid, section 21(1).  
76




 Ibid.  
79
 NPA Act, section 22(2)(b).  
80 Ibid, section 22(2)(c).   
81
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 148. 
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bb) Appointments  
The National Director of Public Prosecutions is appointed by the President 
only.
82
  Deputy national directors of public prosecutions, directors of public 
prosecutions and ‘special directors’ are also appointed by the President, but in 
consultation with the Minister of Justice and the National Director.
83
     
Prosecutors are appointed on the recommendation of the National Director or 




cc) Terms of office and remuneration 
The National Director is appointed for a non-renewable period of ten years.
85
 
Deputy national directors and directors of public prosecution serve unrestricted 
terms until the age of 65 years.
86
 The grounds on which the National Director, 
his deputies or directors may be suspended or removed from office are limited 
and any such decision of the President must be ratified by Parliament.
87
 The 
President must remove the National Director, his deputies or a director from 
office if requested to do so by both Houses of Parliament.
88
  
The remuneration and terms of conditions of service of the National Director, 
his deputies and directors are determined by the President provided that the 
salary of the National Director is at least that of a high court judge.
89
  
Deputy Directors and other prosecutors below that rank are largely subject to 
public service rules in relation to their appointment and dismissal.
90
 Their 
salaries are determined by the Minister of Justice after consultation with the 
National Director and the Minister of Public Services and Administration, and 
with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance.
91
 It is argued that the effect of 
                                                
82
 NPA Act, section 10 (as decreed in section 179(1)(a) of the South African Constitution). 
83
 Ibid, section 11(1), as amended, and section 13(1)(a), (c).   
84
 Ibid, section 16(1).  
85 The term of office will be shorter, if the National Director turns 65 before the end of his 
term, NPA Act, section 12(1).    
86
 Ibid, sections 12(2), 14(1).  
87
 Ibid, sections 12(6), 14(3).  
88 Ibid, sections 12(7), 14(3).  
89
 Ibid, section 17(1)(a); the salary of a deputy national director may not be less than 85% of 
that of the National Director, the salary of a director may not be less than 80% of the salary of 
the National Director (Ibid, section 17(1)(a), (b)).  
90 Ibid, section 19. 
91
 Ibid, section 18. 
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these arrangements is that prosecutors are structurally far less independent than 
their more senior colleagues.
92
          
 
dd) Impartiality and non-interference 
According to section 32(1)(a) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, 
members of the NPA are obliged to  
‘serve impartially and exercise, carry out or perform their powers, 
duties and functions in good faith and without fear, favour or prejudice 
and subject only to the Constitution and the law.’  
 
This provision is designed to deter NPA members from submitting to undue 
outside influence.
93
 Conversely, section 32(1)(b) stipulates that, subject to the 
Constitution and the Act, no organ or member of the state or any other person 
shall interfere with, hinder or obstruct the Prosecuting Authority. 




ee) Investigating directorates 
Before the promulgation of the National Prosecuting Act, prosecutors did not 
have the authority to investigate crimes.
95
 At best, they could monitor and 
guide police investigation, but the police were not obliged to follow their 
instructions.
96
 Under the new Act directors of public prosecutions can oblige 
the police to conduct investigations and obtain statements.
97
  Moreover, formal 
investigative powers are granted to the Prosecuting Authority through the 
structure of investigating directorates.  
The President may – on recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the 
National Director and after submission to Parliament – establish – apart from 
the Directorate of Special Operations – not more than two additional 
investigating directorates in the office of the National Director.
98
 Every 
                                                
92
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 147.  
93
 Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 41. 
94
 NPA Act, section 41(1).  
95
 Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 41.  
96
 Ibid. 
97 NPA Act, section 24(4)(c). 
98
 Ibid, sections 7(1A), (2), as amended.  
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investigating directorate is headed by a director of public prosecutions
99
 who is 
– after consultation with the Minister of Justice and the National Director – 
appointed by the President.
100
 Investigating directors are subjected to the 
control and directions of the National Director.
101
 Investigating directors are 
assisted by deputy directors of public prosecutions, prosecutors, civil servants 
or employees of any public or other body seconded to the investigating 
directorate and any other person whose services are obtained by the head of the 
investigating directorate.
102
 This permits investigating directorates to be staffed 
with a multidisciplinary team of people who can contribute their skills in 
fulfilling the mandate of the directorate.
103
            
Investigating directorates may conduct investigations and then prosecute on the 
result of such investigations. For this purpose investigating directorates are 
granted considerable powers.
104
 If an investigating director has reason to 
suspect that a specified offence has been or is being committed, or that an 
attempt is being made to commit such an offence, he may conduct an 
investigation on the matter in question.
105
 The investigation can be extended to 
include any offence which may be connected with the subject of an 
investigation.
106
 An investigating director can summon any person, who is 
believed to be able to furnish information on the subject of the investigation, or 
has any document or other object relating to this subject, to appear before 
him.
107
 Summoned persons can be questioned under oath by an investigating 
director or a person designated by him; documents and other objects can be 
examined or retained.
108
 Summoned persons are not entitled to refuse to answer 
any question upon the ground that the answer could expose them to a criminal 
charge.
109
         
                                                
99
 Ibid, section 7(3)(b), as amended. 
100
 Ibid, section 13(1)(b).  
101
 Ibid, section 7(3)(b), as amended; section 20(3).  
102 Ibid, section 7(4)(a) as amended. 
103
 Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 42.  
104
 NPA Act, Chapter 5, as amended: Powers, duties and functions relating to investigation 
directorates (sections 26-31).   
105 Ibid, section 28(1)(a), as amended.  
106
 Ibid, section 28(1)(c), as amended. 
107
 Ibid, section 28(6)(a), as amended. 
108
 Ibid, section 28(6)(b), as amended.  
109 Ibid, section 28(8)(a). The given answers are generally not admissible against the 
summoned person in any criminal proceeding (ibid, section 28(8)(b)).  
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An investigating director or persons designated by him are entitled to enter and 
search premises where anything connected with an investigation is suspected to 
be.
110
 Any object found in the premise can be examined, and information 
regarding this object can be requested from the owner or person in charge of 
the premises.
111
 Anyone who refuses to supply requested information, give 
false or misleading information or hinders investigations is guilty of an 
offence.
112
 Anything on or in the premise, that might have a bearing on the 
investigation can be seized.
113
        
Investigating directors, or personnel authorized by them, have countrywide 
jurisdiction, including appeals emanating from criminal proceedings instituted 
by an investigating director.
114
   
 
4. Further legislation relevant to prosecutorial work   
Further legislation, such as the Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, the 
Witness Protection Act No 112 of 1998, the Prevention of Organised Crime 
Act No 121 of 1998, the Promotion to Access of Information Act No 2 of 
2000, the Domestic Violence Act No 116 of 1998 and the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act No 12 of 2004 include provisions relevant 
to prosecutorial work.   
 
5. Evaluation of the legislative framework 
The adoption of the National Prosecuting Authority Act has changed the legal 
surrounding for prosecutors significantly. But the question is whether the 
provisions of the Act enable and empower the prosecution service to fulfil its 
crucial role and function in the South African criminal justice system 
effectively. Moreover, it is important to determine whether the Act makes 
sufficient provisions in terms of accountability of the prosecuting authority on 
the one hand and its independence on the other hand. 
                                                
110 Ibid, section 29(1). In accordance with section 29(4) a warrant from a court is required to 
perform such rights. Section 29(10) makes an exception to this rule for certain cases. 
111
 Ibid, section 29(1)(b).  
112
 Ibid, section 29(12). 
113 Ibid, section 29(1)(a).  
114
 Ibid, section 24(2).  
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Combating crime is rather a national than a provincial task.
115
 A centralised 
prosecuting authority allows for a better coordination of all role-players in the 
criminal justice system. Moreover, the National Prosecuting Authority Act 
takes developments on a national level into account that have already 
commenced before its promulgation, such as the operation of investigating 






 it is argued that the publication of the National Prosecuting 
Policy
118
 and the obligation of the National Director to submit annual reports to 
Parliament are potentially appropriate elements to facilitate openness and 
accountability. Nevertheless, in the case of the annual report, for example, 
much depends on what the report contains and on how critically it is 
scrutinised by Parliament.     
Political accountability is guaranteed, because the Minister of Justice must 
exercise final responsibility over the Prosecuting Authority. He has to answer 
to Parliament and through it to the public for the operations of the Prosecuting 
Authority.
119
   
Although accountability to a democratically elected body is an important 
principle, its concrete implementation may be restricted in the light of the fact 
that it can negatively impact on prosecutorial independence. It is argued
120
 that 
some aspects of the newly established prosecutorial system militate against 
independence. One of these is the mode of appointment of the National 
Director. When the NPA Act was being drafted it was argued
121
 that the 
National Director, although formally appointed by the President as required by 
the Constitution, should be selected by the Judicial Service Commission, which 
would then submit a proposal to the President. Such a provision in the National 
                                                
115 The National Crime Prevention Strategy takes this insight into account.  
116
 The Office for Serious Economic Offences had already been operating before the 
promulgation of the NPA Act (Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 149).  
117
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), pp. 149 f.   
118
 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Prosecution Policy (Revision Date: 1 Dec 
2005). 
119
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 150. 
120
 Ibid, p. 151.  
121 Sarkin, J. and Cowen, S. ‘The draft National Prosecuting Bill 1997: A critique’ (1997) 
South African Journal of Criminal Justice Vol. 10, Issue 1, 64-74, pp. 66 f.  
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Prosecuting Authority Act would have isolated the appointee more effectively 
from intervention by the legislature.
122
       
In the field of policy formation the independence of the National Director is 
small.
123
 However, this might be justifiable in the light of the particular South 
African situation. In the literature
124
 it is argued that the adoption of the 
opportunity principle in prosecution creates such a wide discretion for 
prosecutors that it necessitates policy on when to prosecute. While the impact 
of such policy is quite substantial it has to be subjected to some degree of 
political control.
125
 This is particularly true in South Africa where crime 
control is a major political issue, resources in the criminal justice system are 
limited and where politicians are responsible for ensuring that these resources 
are deployed efficiently and in compliance with a strategy that carries the 
approval of the electorate.
126
  
Notwithstanding this, the issue of prosecutorial independence in individual 
cases is of concern. A decision whether or not to prosecute can have profound 
consequences for victims, witnesses, accused and their families.
127
 Legislation 
provides for prosecutorial independence by stipulating that every member of 
the Prosecuting Authority shall perform his powers, duties and functions in 
good faith and without fear, favour or prejudice. But, at the same time, all 
prosecutors are largely subordinated to the National Director. His power to 
intervene in individual cases if policy is not followed or to ‘review’ specific 
decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute bears the risk of undermining the 
independence of the Prosecuting Authority if he himself is not sufficiently 
independent.
128
 The facts that he is a political appointment and his very close 
relationship with the Minister of Justice in the policy sphere have a potentially 
negative impact on the National Director’s independence in individual cases. 
                                                
122
 Although being a former senior ANC member, Bulelani Ngucka, the first NDPP, resisted 
political influence throughout his term of office.  
123 See above, III.3.b)aa). 
124
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), pp. 151 f. 
125
 Ibid, p. 152. 
126
 Ibid.  
127 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa op cit (note 118), section 4(a).  
128
 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), p. 153.  
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Only the fact that it is relatively difficult to remove him from his office might 
contribute to his independence.
129
                        
Formal independence does not guarantee fairness any more than its absence 
suggests partiality. Guarantees, it is argued,
130
 can exist elsewhere, for example 
in judicial review. Moreover, traditional legal mechanisms for constraining the 
unfair exercise of prosecutorial discretion remain in place. Prosecutors under 
the new Act are delictually liable for malicious prosecutions just as their 
predecessors were.
131
 Although the institution of a private prosecution
132
 is a 
complex and potentially expensive procedure, it must be, nevertheless, 
recognized as a safeguard against unbridled prosecutorial discretion.
133
      
 
IV. Policy documents and United Nations Guidelines 
Apart from the South African Constitution and the National Prosecuting 
Authority Act, policy documents and the United Nations Guidelines on the 
Role of Prosecutors are of importance for the National Prosecuting Authority 
and its prosecutors.    
 
1. Prosecution Policy 
As discussed above,
134
 the National Director is obliged to determine a 
prosecution policy for the National Prosecuting Authority. The first 
prosecution policy was tabled in Parliament in 1999 and has been revised in 
2005.
135
    
The prosecution policy is a product of consultations of prosecutors, criminal 
justice organisations, government departments, academic institutions and 




 Ibid, pp. 153 f.  
131 Van Zyl Smit, Steyn op cit (note 10), pp. 154 f., note 46 therein citing court decisions.   
132 Sections 7-18 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provide the option of a private 
prosecution for persons with ‘substantial and peculiar interest’ in a matter, who believe that, 
notwithstanding an official decision not to prosecute on behalf of the state, they could bring a 
successful criminal prosecution (section 7(1)(a)).  
133




 Stipulations have been included with regard to the prosecution of persons who were refused 
or failed to apply for amnesty in terms of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process 
(National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa op cit (note 118), pp.1-8). The PCLU deals 




 It seeks to promote the exercise of authority by 
prosecutors, and to contribute to the ‘fair and even-handed administration’ of 
criminal law by prosecutors.
137
 Efficient prosecutorial work shall enhance 
public confidence in the criminal justice system.
138
              
The prosecution policy sets out ‘with due regard to the law, the way in which 
the Prosecuting Authority and individual prosecutors should exercise their 
discretion.’
139
 Moreover, the policy seeks to guide prosecutors in the way they 
perform their functions, exercise their powers and carry out their duties in 




The primary function of a prosecutor is to assist the court in coming to a just 
verdict.
141
 Furthermore, prosecutors represent the community in criminal trials 
and have to ensure that the interests of victims and witnesses are promoted.
142
  
Prosecutors have discretion at different stages of the criminal justice process. 
They have, for example, the discretion whether or not to institute criminal 
proceedings against an accused, whether or not to withdraw charges or stop the 
prosecution against an accused, or whether or not to oppose and application of 
bail, or to release an accused who is in custody following an arrest.
143
 
Furthermore, prosecutors have the discretion to decide with which crimes an 
accused is charged and in which court the trial should take place, whether or 
not to accept a plea of guilty tendered by an accused, which evidence to present 
during trail and at the sentencing stage, and whether or not to appeal or seek 
review of proceedings.
144
           
When exercising their discretion prosecutors must act impartially and in good 
faith.
145
 They should not allow their judgement to be influenced by factors such 
as their personal views regarding the nature of the offence, or the race, national 
                                                






 Ibid, section 2.  
140 Ibid.  
141









origin, gender, religious beliefs, status, political beliefs or sexual orientation of 
the victim, witnesses or the accused.
146
   
The prosecution policy lists criteria to assist prosecutors in coming to a 
decision whether or not to prosecute.
147
  The policy emphasises the importance 
of this decision as it may have profound consequences on the victim, witness, 
the accused and their families. A wrong decision may also undermine the 
community’s confidence in the prosecution system.
148
 Prosecutors are advised 
not to waste resources by pursuing inappropriate cases, but to focus on those 
cases worthy of prosecution.
149
 Therefore prosecutors should only institute 
criminal proceedings against an accused, where there is sufficient and 
admissible evidence to provide a reasonable prospect of a successful 
prosecution.
150
 The test of a ‘reasonable prospect’ must be applied objectively 
after careful deliberation to avoid an unjustified prosecution.
151
 Where it is 
difficult to make a proper assessment whether to prosecute or not, the 
prosecutor should probe deeper than merely relying on the contents of the 
police docket and written statements provided by the police. Consultation with 
prospective witnesses to evaluate their credibility and an accurate consideration 
of the accused’s version is recommended.
152
 Moreover, the prosecution policy 
lists a range of factors prosecutors should take into account when deciding 
whether of not to institute a prosecution:
153
 the strength of the state’s case, the 
admissibility of the state’s evidence, the credibility of the state’s witness, the 
strength of the defence’s case, and the extent to which the prosecution would 
be in the public interest.
154
  
The prosecution policy advises prosecutors also on how to review a case with 
special regard to the stopping of proceedings and restarting of prosecutions.
155
 
Furthermore, criteria are given on how to determine the appropriate forum of 














 Ibid, section 4(b), (c).  
154
 When considering whether or not a prosecution would be the public interest, prosecutors 
should pay special attention to the nature and seriousness of the offence, the interests of the 
victim and the broader community and the circumstances of the offender (ibid, section 4(c)).   
155
 Ibid, section 5. 
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trial, on the selection of the appropriate charge(s) and on the acceptance of 
defence offers of guilty plea.
156
  
The prosecution policy pays particular attention to the role of prosecutors in the 
trial process.
157
 Prosecutors are admonished to present their cases ‘fearlessly, 
vigorously and skilfully.’ At the same time, prosecutors must present the facts 
of a case to a court fairly.
158
 This includes the disclosure of information 
favourable to the defence even though it may be adverse to the prosecution 
case.
159
 Prosecutors should show sensitivity and understanding to victims and 
witnesses and should assist in providing them with protection where necessary 
and with information on the trail process.
160
 
Concerning the investigation and prosecution of crime, the policy states that 
the relationship between prosecutors and police officials should be one of 
efficient and close co-operation, with mutual respect for the distinct functions 
and operational independence of each profession.
161
 Prosecutors should work 
together with other departments and agencies  
‘such as the departments of Correctional Services and Welfare, lawyer’s 
organizations, non-governmental organisations and other public 
institutions in order to streamline procedures and enhance the quality of 
the service provided.’
162
                             
 
Apart from the prosecution policy, policy directives
163
 with respect to specific 
issues, such as diversion, and a code of conduct
164
 make further stipulations 
with regard to prosecutorial work. 
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 Ibid, section 6.  
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 Ibid, section 7.    
158 Ibid. 
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 Ibid, this provision in the prosecution policy reflects the decision in Shabalala and Others v 








 Required by section 21(1) of the NPA Act.  
164 The Code of Conduct for Members of the National Prosecuting Authority, printed in: Du 
Toit, E., De Jager, F. J., Paizes, A., St Quintin Skeen, A. and Van der Merwe, S. Commentary 
on the Criminal Procedure Act (Service 35, 2006), Cape Town: Juta, Prosecuting – pp. 53-55. 
The Code of Conduct is required by section 22(6)(a) of the NPA Act and includes further 
stipulations with regard to professionalism, independence, and impartiality of prosecutors and 
their role in administrative justice and co-operation with other role players.    
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2. United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors  
The National Prosecuting Authority Act imposes a duty on the National 
Director to bring the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors
165
 
to the attention of the directors of public prosecutions and prosecutors, and to 
promote their respect for and compliance with the principles it contains.
166
 The 
UN Guidelines have been formulated to assist member states in their task of 
securing and promoting the effectiveness, impartiality and fairness of 
prosecutors in criminal proceedings within the framework of the states’ 
national legislation and practice.
167
    
The guidelines contain recommendations with regard to the qualification, 
selection and training of prosecutors,
168
 their status and conditions of 
service,
169
 and their freedom of expression and association.
170
 Furthermore, 
recommendations are made regarding the role of prosecutors in criminal 
proceedings.
171
 The Constitutional Court has stressed that section 13(b) of the 
guidelines is of particular importance for South African prosecutors: 
‘”In the performance of their duties, prosecutors shall: 
(a) …   
(b) Protect the public interest, act with objectivity, take proper account 
of the position of the suspect and the victim and pay attention to all 
relevant circumstances, irrelevant of whether they are to the advantage 




The guidelines also suggest that prosecutors shall perform an active role in 
criminal proceedings, including the institution of prosecutions and, where 
authorised by law or consistent with local practice, in the investigation of 
crime, and supervision over legality of these investigations.
173
 
                                                
165 United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, adopted by the Eighth United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 
27 August to 7 September 1990, hereinafter referred to as the UN Guidelines. 
166
 NPA Act, section 22(4)(f).  
167 UN Guidelines, preamble. 
168
 Ibid, sections 1, 2. 
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 Ibid, sections 3-7.  
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 Ibid, sections 8, 9. 
171 Ibid, sections 10-16. 
172
 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC), at 
1012A-C; in the context of bail applications this means that prosecutors are under a general 
duty to place before the court any information relevant to the refusal or grant of bail and might 
reasonably hold liable for negligently failing to fulfil that duty (Ibid, at 1020C-E).      
173
 UN Guidelines, section 11; this issue will be explored further below, IX.5b). 
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Concerning discretionary functions of public prosecutors it is recommended 
that in countries where prosecutors are vested with such functions, the law or 
published rules or regulations shall provide guidelines to enhance fairness and 





 the NPA prosecution policy guides South African prosecutors in 
this respect. 
With regard to alternatives to prosecution it is recommended that in accordance 
with national law, prosecutors shall give due consideration to waiving 
prosecution, discontinuing proceedings, or diverting criminal cases from the 
formal criminal justice system, with full respect for the rights of the suspects 
and victims. For this purpose, states should fully explore the possibility of 
adopting diversion schemes not only to alleviate excessive court loads, but also 
to avoid the stigmatisation of pre-trial detention, charge and conviction, as well 
as the possible adverse effects of imprisonment.
176
  
Finally the UN Guidelines make recommendations with regard to the relations 
of prosecutors to other government agencies or institutions,
177





3. Criminal justice policy papers 
a) National Crime Prevention Strategy 
The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) was adopted in 1996 and is 
the South African government’s blueprint for dealing with crime. It seeks to 
establish a comprehensive policy framework which addresses crime ‘in a co-
ordinated and focused manner’ and which ‘draws on the resources of all 
government agencies, as well as civil society.’
179
 With regard to the criminal 
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 Ibid, section 17.  
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 Ibid, section 20.  
178
 Ibid, sections 21-24. 
179 Departments of Correctional Services, Defence, Intelligence, Justice, Safety & Security and 








One of the ‘national programmes’ of the NCPS addresses directly the 
prosecutorial sector.
182
 It requires a prosecutorial policy, which places 
emphasis on priority crimes, ensures that the needs of special interest groups 





 the current prosecution policy advises prosecutors to take in 
their decision whether or not to prosecute – amongst other criteria – the public 
interest into account. Priority crimes can be considered here.
185
 Moreover, 
prosecutors are urged to give special attention to the effective and speedy 
disposal of cases identified as priority matters.
186
 The current policy 
admonishes prosecutors to assist victims
187
 and witnesses and to co-operate 
with the police closely and efficiently, as well as with other state departments 
and agencies.  
The NCPS also demands an increased use of diversion programmes for petty 
offenders and juveniles.
188
 In the context of juvenile and petty offenders the 
prosecution policy advises prosecutors to prove whether ‘non-criminal 
alternatives to prosecution’ are more appropriate.
189
 Such alternatives include 
diversion.   
                                                
180
 One of the four pillars of the NCPS; the other pillars are: community values & education, 
environmental design and trans-national crime (ibid, p. 8). 
181 Ibid, p. 9, the aims are:  
‘- To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system as a 
deterrent to crime and as a source of relief and support to victims.  
 - To improve the access of disempowered groups to the criminal justice process, 
including women, children and victims in general.  
- To focus resources of the criminal justice process focused on priority crimes.  
- To forge inter departmental integration of policy and management, in the interest of 
co-ordinated planning, coherent action and the effective use of resources.  
- To improve service delivered by the criminal justice process to victims through, 
through increasing accessibility to victims and sensitivity to their needs.’           
182





 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa op cit (note 118), section 4(c) where, for 
example, the effect of the committed offence on public order and morale, its economic impact 
or its effect on the peace of mind and the sense of security of the public are listed as criteria of 
decision.   
186
 Ibid, section 7. 
187
 Victim support and protection is required explicitly under national programme 1.9: victim 
empowerment programme, NCPS Summary, p. 13. 
188 National programme 1.6: diversion programme, NCPS Summary (note 179) p. 12. 
189
 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa op cit (note 118), section 4(c). 
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b) Integrated Justice System 
The Integrated Justice System (IJS) is a result of the NCPS and seeks to 
‘increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire criminal justice process 
by increasing the probability of successful investigation, prosecution, 
punishment for priority crimes and rehabilitation of offenders.’
190
 With regard 
to limited resources duplication of programmes and service shall be avoided by 
all means. A second version of the IJS was published in 2003.
191
  
In accordance with the IJS several programmes and services have been 
introduced.
192
 For example, a criminal justice review commission was installed 
to check whether current programmes and services in the criminal justice 
system are feasible and how they can be improved and aligned with 
international best practice.
193
 A victim empowerment programme, for example, 
has located a 66 court preparation officials under the umbrella of the NPA who 
assist victims and prepare them for court proceedings.
194
 Specialized 
commercial crime, sexual offences and environmental courts have been 
introduced in some parts of the country.
195
 Some 46 case-flow management 
centres, an e-justice programme and a court process project have been 
established to improve the service delivery of the court and to assist the courts 
in the management of caseloads.
196
      
 
c) Strategies of other state departments and agencies 
As long as the Integrated Justice System is not completely implemented, the 
National Prosecution Authority also has to take the strategies of other 
departments and agencies, such as the South African Police Service (SAPS)
197
 
or the Department of Correctional Services into consideration.  
 
                                                
190 http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/justice/system.htm, accessed: 05.01.2007.   
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 Ibid.   
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 Ibid.   
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 Ibid.  
194 Ibid.  
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 http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/justice/system.htm, accessed: 05.01.2007; environmental 
courts have been established at Hermanus and Port Elizabeth. 
196
 Ibid.   
197 http://www.saps.gov.za/saps_profile/strategic_framework/strategic_plan/2004_2007/ 
direction.htm, accessed: 05.01.2007.  
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V. Transitional starting point of the NPA 
Apart from the constitutional and legislative changes it is also important to 
understand the situation of the prosecution service in the transitional process.
198
  
At the end of the apartheid regime the whole criminal justice system was in a 
bad shape.
199
 A large part of the resources allocated to law enforcement was 
focused on political activities instead of ordinary crimes. As a result, skills and 
expertise concerning proper investigation and prosecution of crime was 
underdeveloped.
200
 Furthermore, the state allowed the use of violence as an 
investigation tool. It was not uncommon that convictions were based on 
confessions extracted under duress.
201
 The illegitimacy of the government 
produced lawlessness and disrespect for the rule of law at least among the 
black part of the population. Often people felt morally justified to break the law 
and police and prosecutors lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the 
people.
202
    
Therefore, the newly introduced National Prosecuting Authority was asked to 
regain the faith and trust of the majority of the population in the fact that the 
criminal justice system was now only delivering justice and was no longer the 
instrument of the oppressing minority.
203
 Moreover, the prosecution service 
tried to create a new image. In this context the prosecutors are often referred to 
as being ‘lawyers for the people.’       
 
VI. Intermediate result 
The constitutional and legislative framework in place, just as the policy papers 
enable the prosecution service to operate effectively. The question is whether 
this is reflected by the actual performance of the prosecution service.  
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VII. Assessment of the prosecuting performance   
In order to analyse whether the prosecution service is fulfilling its role and 
function in the criminal justice system efficiently and effectively and in order 
to determine the challenges it is facing, it is necessary to asses its current 
performance.  
It is somewhat difficult to measure the performance of the prosecution service 
reliable and fairly.
204
 The work of the prosecution service – as part of the 
whole criminal justice system – is influenced by a variety of factors, such as 
prevailing social values, unemployment levels or the demographic composition 
of a population,
205
 over which it has no control. Moreover, the work of the 
prosecution service is linked closely to the performance of other role players in 
the criminal justice system. For example, a performance indicator for the 
prosecution service is the length of time it takes to finalize a case in court. But 
the finalization is not only reliant on the skills of the prosecutor; it also depends 
on a proper and sound investigation by the police service. A prosecutor has 
generally
206
 only limited control over the actions of the investigating officer of 
a case. But even when a good prosecutor who exploits his limited control and 
guides the detective in the investigation of a case, much still depends on the 
calibre of work delivered. Nevertheless, the case processing rate remains a 
useful performance measurement for the prosecution service provided that the 
described limitations are taken into account.                       
 
1. Cases prosecuted  
The number of cases where the prosecution service institutes a prosecution as a 
proportion of the number of recorded cases is low. In 1999 it was 25.4% for 
murder, about 16% for rape and for assault with the intent to commit grievous 
bodily harm, 10.2% for common assault, 6.5% for residential housebreaking, 
4.3% for robbery with aggravating circumstances, and fewer than 3% for car 
                                                
204
 Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 95 f.  
205
 Crime is generally committed by young males between the ages of 14 and 25 years; in 
South Africa over 53% of the population are under 24 years (Compare: Masuku, S. and Meapa, 
T. ‘City Safety – Neslon Mandela Metro Muncipality’s Crime Reduction Strategy’ (2004) ISS 
Monograph No 103, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, p. 25, available at: 
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_id=3, accessed: 07.01.2007).          
206
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 34 
theft and car hijacking.
207
 For crimes that depend on police action for their 
detection, the proportion of cases prosecuted was much higher; for drunk-
driving and drug-related offences it was over 50%.
208
   
 
2. Successful prosecutions 
The number of cases resulting in a conviction as a proportion of the number of 
recorded cases is also low. In 1999 it ranged from just over 50% for drug-





3. Cases withdrawn in court  
There are several reasons that can lead to the withdrawal of a case in court. For 
example, a victim knows the offender or is related to him and declines 
therefore to testify against him. Sometimes an expert’s report is required in a 
particular matter and may delay the trial until it is furnished. Consequently, 
there will be always a certain percentage of cases withdrawn in court. But a 
relatively high withdrawal rate is nevertheless an indicator for the fact that 
cases are referred to the court, even though they were not proper investigated 
and checked by the prosecutors.            
In 2005/2006 there were 1,075,581 new cases taken on by the prosecution 
service of which 311,087 were withdrawn, this is a quota of 29%.
210
 The 
number of cases withdrawn in court has decreased in the last three financial 
years from 414,211 in 2002/03 to 311,087 in 2005/06.
211
 This was a reduction 
of 24.9% over that period. Although this is a positive development, it has to 
been seen in the light of the past, where the proportion of cases withdrawn in 
court increased significantly. In 1996, 34% of the cases referred to court were 
withdrawn, thereafter withdrawals increased as follows: 36% in 1997, 38% in 
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1998, 42% in 1999, and 46% in 2000.
212
 Against this background it seems that 
the prosecution service now screens with more accuracy which cases it takes 
on.   
 
4. Conviction Rate  
Once the prosecution service decides to institute a prosecution, its success rate 
is high. In 2005/2006 the overall conviction rate (all courts together) was 85.7 
% which related to a conviction rate of 87% in the high courts, 71% in the 
regional courts and 87% in the district courts.
213
 But this is not a new 
development. During the last five decades the proportion of cases prosecuted 
successfully has been consistently high – between 71 % and 82%.
214
 Moreover, 
it is not surprising that accused persons will be convicted once they have made 
their journey through most of the criminal justice system, and the prosecution 
service decides to prosecute them. The reason for this lies with the fact that 
cases are usually prosecuted only where there is a reasonable prospect of 
obtaining a conviction, which means cases where the evidence is substantially 
in favour of the prosecution’s case.
215
 Over the period from 2002/03 to 2005/06 
the number of new cases taken on by the prosecution service has decreased by 
4% from 1,117,879 to 1,074,581.
216
                         
 
5. Number of awaiting trial prisoners 
Awaiting trial prisoners are unsentenced prisoners, who are awaiting the 
commencement and/or the conclusion of their trials in court. This is because 
the courts refused to grant them bail, or because they cannot afford the amount 
of bail that has been set by the courts.
217
 The length of time they spend in 
prison awaiting trial depends on factors, such as the speed of police 
investigation, the length of the trial and the number of postponements the 
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accused requests during the trial.
218
 Over these factors the prosecution service 
has little or no control. But in many cases the finalisation of trials is delayed 
because the courts’ rolls are too full or badly managed.
219
 This is something 
over which the prosecution service has some influence. Changing levels of 
awaiting trial prisoner numbers are therefore another measurement of the 
efficiency and performance of the prosecution service.
220
                     
At the end of 2005, 46,327 (29%) of the total 157,402 South African prisoners 
were unsentenced. This was a decrease by some 5000 awaiting trial prisoners, 
compared to the 51,538 unsentenced prisoners at the end of March 2005.
221
 
This development has to be seen again in the light of the past. From June 1994 
to December 2000 the number of awaiting trial prisoners increased from 
19,517 to 55,558, which relates to 184%.
222
 Over the same period the number 
of sentenced prisoners increased only from 79,987 to 107,998, which relates to 
35%.
223
              
Additionally, the average length of time awaiting trial prisoners remain 
incarcerated until the finalisation of their trials rose considerably from 76 days 
in 1996 to 139 days in 2002.
224
 While a prisoner costs the Department of 
Correctional Services R 113.99 per day,
225
 the financial burden that the average 
awaiting trial detainee places on the department and the criminal justice system 
is around R 15,840. At the end of 2005, 42% of all awaiting trial prisoners 
were held for more than three month, 11,565 for more than 6 month and 1,433 
for more than two years 
226
 This is problematic, as section 35(3)(d) of the 
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Constitution guarantees the right of every accused to have their trial begin and 
conclude without unreasonable delay.     
 
6. Finalised and outstanding cases 
In 2005/06 a total of 414,282 cases were finalised in the South African courts. 
37,422 of these cases were finalised through diversion.
227
 Diversion is defined 
‘as the channelling of prima facie cases away from the criminal justice system 
with or without conditions’
228
 at the discretion of the prosecution.
229
 The use of 
diversion has increased from 2002/03 (14,808) to 2005/06 (37,422) by 
152.7%.
230
 This is a very positive development as diversion has a lot of 
benefits, such as saving resources of the criminal justice system (court hours 
etc) and avoiding stigmatising effects of the trial on the accused person. But if 
one considers that the NPS finalised a total of 414,282 cases in the same 




A matter of concern is the fact that 198,990 cases were outstanding in 2005/06. 
Despite a decrease compared to 2004/05 (206,005) by 3.4%, there was an 
overall increase by 5.5% over the period from 2002/03 (188,691) to 2005/06.
232
   
The NPS has set targets for case cycle times. The target for the regional courts 
was that 78% of the cases should not be older than 6 month, for district courts 
it was that 90% of the cases should not be older than 6 month.
233
 The backlog 
of cases is defined as the number of cases that exceed their cycle time.
234
      
At the end of March 2006, a total of 36,915 cases (19% of the outstanding 
court roll of 197,404 cases) were older than six month. This was an increase in 
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The NPA Annual Report 05/06 lists several factors that contributed to the 
increased backlog.
236
 According to the report the case cycle times increased 
because accused persons did not attended court proceedings, courts issued a 
growing number of warrants, adequate court facilities were lacking, some role 
players in the criminal justice system were unavailable, or investigations were 
incomplete. This enumeration reveals a lot about the current state of affairs in 
the South African criminal justice system. But there a two more factors listed 
that fall more directly within the sphere of responsibility of the prosecution 
service. The increased backlog resulted also from a lack of commitment to a 
proper implementation of the case flow management principles and a vacancy 
rate of 10% in the prosecution service. The report admits that the current 
personnel are already so inundated with heavy workloads that it could not 
compensate for the vacant posts.             
In this context it is also remarkable that in 2005/06 only 1,432 cases were 
finalised by the ‘additional and Saturday courts’.
237
 Over the period from 
2002/03 to 2005/06 the number of cases finalised by such courts decreased by 
95.2%.
238
   
 
7. Plea and sentence agreements  
In 2005/06 plea and sentence agreements were reached in 2,164 offences.
239
 
With regard to the main crime categories plea and sentence agreements were 
achieved in 1,202 cases. This is an increase compared to the 703 cases of the 
previous year.
240
 Plea and sentence agreements shorten the length of trials and 
reduce the workload of courts. Therefore the use of these instruments has to be 
embraced and should be increased. If one considers that the NPS finalised a 
total of 414,282 cases in the same period, it seems necessary to explore why 
currently plea and sentence agreements are reached only in such a small 
number of cases.
241
 The increase from 2004/05 to 2005/06 indicates that there 
is considerable room for improvement.     
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8. Use of court hours 
Prosecutors are responsible for managing the rolls of the courts they are 
working in.
242
 Even though unused court time can result from a variety of 
reasons, such as the absence of witnesses or successful postponement petitions 
of the accused, it also indicates whether court rolls were planned accurately 
and efficiently. During 2005/2006 the average high court sat for 3h19, the 
average regional court for 4h02, and the average district court for 4h08.
243
 The 
courts are working below their potential capacity. In theory, courts are open six 
hours a day (from 9h00 to 11h00, from 11h15 to 13h00; and from 13h45 to 
16h00).
244
 Although six-hour-court-days are impossible to achieve in practice, 
there is considerable room for many courts that sit for even shorter periods than 
the present overall average of around four hours.  This has also been realised 
by the NPS, which set the targets concerning court hours for the high courts at 
4h00 (actual time 2005/06 was 17% below target),
 245
 for the regional courts at 
4h30 (actual time in 2005/06 was 10 % below target) and for the district courts 
at 4h45 (actual time in 2005/06 was 13% below target).
246
            
The insufficient use of court hours at the district court level is somewhat 
qualified by the fact that the time spent on alternative measures to reduce trial 
cases is not covered by these statistics.
247
 Furthermore, the NPA Annual Report 
argues that a considerable increase in the court hours on the district level is 
only then likely to happen, when the ratio of two prosecutors per court is 
accomplished.
248
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VIII. Transitional development of the South African prosecution service: 
Analysing the reasons for the achieved performance  
With regard to the eight indicators discussed above, the assessment of the 
prosecuting performance is two-folded. On the one hand improvements can be 
seen in the slight decrease of the number of cases withdrawn in court and the 
slight decrease of the number of awaiting trial prisoners. Nevertheless these 
improvements are qualified by the huge increases of both numbers in the 
past
249
 and as far as awaiting trial prisoners are concerned, by the fact that the 
average length of time those prisoners remain detained rose considerably. The 
relatively high conviction rates of the courts are also positive, although the 
number of cases taken on by the prosecution has decreased. Furthermore, the 
increased use of diversion and of plea and sentence agreements is another 
positive development, although there seems to be considerable room for 
improvement.              
On the other hand, some of the indicators suggest that the performance of the 
prosecution service is insufficient. The ratio of cases prosecuted and of cases 
successfully prosecuted to the number of reported crimes is very low. 
Moreover, the huge number of outstanding cases and the increased backlog of 
cases are alarming. The insufficient use of court hours is a further matter of 
concern. 
The question is what are the reasons for the current underperformance of the 
South African prosecution service?  
This part of the thesis tries to identify which problems have existed and still 
exist in the prosecutorial sector and which responses and countermeasures have 
been taken so far to address them.   
Since the early 1990s the South African literature on the prosecution service 
has identified problems within the prosecutorial sector that negatively impact 
on its performance.
250
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1. High personnel turnover   
A main reason that is given for the insufficient performance of the prosecution 
service is a steady loss of experienced personnel.
251
  
In the mid-1990s about 630 experienced prosecutors resigned from their 
office.
252
 Most of them had started their career under the apartheid regime and 
felt swamped with the transitional process.
253
 Although these prosecutors were 
replaced and the absolute number of prosecutors employed has consistently 
increased the result of this high personnel turnover was a great loss of 
experience in the prosecution service.
254
 In the literature
255
 it is estimated that 
more than 2,000 years of work experience were extracted out of the 
prosecution service.  
Even if this massive wave of resignation had a somewhat exceptional 
character, a dominant feature of the South African prosecution services is the 
high turnover amongst its personnel in general.
256
 In 2005/06 the overall 
turnover rate within the NPA was 20.1%.
257
 Among permanent prosecutors it 
was 15%, among senior managers it was 10.3%.
258
 The main reasons why staff 
was leaving the NPA were in 94% of the cases resignation and the expiring of 
contracts. Retirement and other reasons amounted only to 6%.
259
 
The personnel turnover within the prosecution service results in a low level of 
experience of the average prosecutor. In October 2000, some 2,171 prosecutors 
below the rank of senior public prosecutors, and junior state advocates were 
employed by the Department of Justice.
260
 24% of them had been prosecuting 
for less than 18 months, and another 28% had worked as prosecutors for 
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A low experience level has debilitating effects on most professions, but 
especially if they are practically orientated, as prosecuting is. Prosecuting 
requires a whole range of practical skills. For example, the ability to apply 
legal theory to actual cases before the court or to present witnesses and 
evidence in a manner that builds a convincing case is acquired and perfected 
through practice and experience and cannot easily be taught.
262
 Moreover, the 
high staff fluctuation negatively impacts on long term strategic planning and 
organisation within the NPA.
263
             
Reasons for the high turnover of personnel can be identified:  
 
a) Poor remuneration  
A reason for leaving the prosecution service was and is the relatively poor 
salary.
264
 Although the salary of prosecutors has increased based on the 
performance as the NPS reports,
265
 it must be critically questioned whether the 
conclusion drawn by the NPS is true that now only a few prosecutors leave the 
service because of insufficient pay.    
There are some aspects that militate against this conclusion. Compared to the 
private sector the salary of prosecutors is quite low.
266
 Moreover, prosecutors 
earn considerably less than magistrates. In 2006, the starting salary of a 
magistrate increased to R 289,167 (+ R 72,292 motor vehicle allowance)
267
 per 
annum, while a beginner prosecutor earned R 79,944.
268
 This was less than a 
third
269
 of the salary of a magistrate. Finally, prosecutors often had to wait 
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The Annual Report 2005/06 of the NPA
271
 lists meticulously – with regard to 
critical occupations – the performance rewards that have been paid in 2005/06. 
In sum, 955 members (24.6%) of the NPA received an average performance 
reward of R 17,663. A ‘recruit to retire’ programme has been started by the 
corporate service of the NPA, which seeks to retain prosecutors in the service 
with several measures, such as 1% pay progressions.
272
 This might be a first 
step to retain experienced personnel, but leaving the prosecution service for a 
job in the private sector or for becoming a magistrate is still a financial 
improvement that even passionate prosecutors can hardly resist.     
 
b) Career prospects and human resource management 
Limited promotional opportunities and challenging career paths are identified 
as a further reason for prosecutors to resign.
273
  
The introduction of performance based salaries is regarded as the basis for the 
new career paths for prosecutors.
274
 Moreover, a Human Resources and 
Development Centre has been established within the Corporate Service 
Division that seeks to address the issue.
275
 But nevertheless in the current 
promotion system the best prosecutors are generally promoted to the level of 
senior or chief prosecutors. Senior prosecutors only rarely appear in court and 
have primarily administrative and managerial duties; chief prosecutors have 
only office-based administrative and managerial duties.
276
 In both cases the 
valuable courtroom skills of experienced prosecutors get lost.  
A performance based salary should, for example, distinguish between 
prosecuting on the district or on the regional court level. The latter requires 
better skills and is accompanied with greater responsibility.
277
 A specialisation, 
                                                
270
 This was admitted in the NPA Annual Report 2003, p. 10. 
271
 Table 7.3, p. 97 f.   
272 NPA Annual Report 05/06, p. 53. 
273
 Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 126 and op cit (note 251), p. 169. 
274
 NPA Annual Report 2003, p. 10.  
275
 NPA Annual Report 05/06, p. 53. 
276 Schönteich op cit (note 4), pp. 126, 163. 
277
 Ibid, p. 127. 
 44 
for example, in sexual offences should be rewarded. How far these suggestions 
are covered by the new salary structure is not clear.     
     
c) Workload and high stress level 
Further reason for prosecutors to leave the service, it is argued, are the 
workloads and stress levels they encounter.
278
  
Apart from onerous caseloads prosecutors are burdened with a wide range of 
duties. For example, prosecutors have to prepare every trial, are responsible for 
the court’s roll (structuring the court day) and present the cases at court. The 
stress level of prosecutors is increased by the fact that their preparation for the 
court appearance is consistently interrupted by investigating officers who need 
to brief them on cases they are working on.
279
 At the same time prosecutors 
also need to consult with witnesses who are going to testify in one of the 
following trials.
280
 Additionally prosecutors have to phone for dockets which 
they need for court that day but which have not been left at the local detectives’ 
office.
281
 Furthermore prosecutors have to make sure that their court’s orderlies 
are bringing the correct awaiting trial prisoners from the court’s holding cells 
to the correct courtroom at the right time.
282
 The already high workload of 
prosecutors is increased by the fact that they have to substitute colleagues who 
are on leave and vacant posts that have not been filled. Often prosecutors have 




Compared to this picture of high workloads and high stress levels the tasks and 
duties of a magistrate seem to be more moderate:  
‘Magistrates are primarily concerned with listening to the evidence that 
is presented to them in court, keeping up-to-date with relevant 
legislation and case law, and formulating reasons for their judgements 
and sentencing decisions.’
284
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Moreover, the fact that the role of the judicial officer is in South Africa, just as 
in common law systems, more contained than in civil law systems, such as 
Germany contributes to this impression. Therefore, many prosecutors consider 
becoming a magistrate as a work reduction which is additionally much better 
paid.
285
 A job in a private company might also be considered as less stress full 
and better paid. However, some encouragement should result for prosecutors 
from the fact that the overtime payment that was stopped in the late 1990s is 
now being re-instituted.
286
          
The NPA has realised that prosecutors should focus on their core functions. 
Administrative staff was employed to assist prosecutors and relieve them from 
administrative duties.
287
 Workshops are held and practical guides are issued to 
assist prosecutors in case flow management.
288
     
 
d) Issues of representivity  
A further reason for especially white male prosecutors to resign was and is 
their smaller chance of promotion within the prosecution service.
289
  
Just as in all other South African state departments and agencies, one of the 
key transformational objectives of the NPA has been to address the issue of 
representivity. Between 1996 and 2000 the number of white prosecutors and 
senior prosecutors dropped from 53% to 36% while the number of blacks 
increased from 47% to 64%.
290
 In 2005/06 only 13% (521 out of 3,884) of the 
whole NPA staff where white males, while in the top management over a third 
(52 out of 142) were white males.
291
 Therefore promotional opportunities are 
limited for white male prosecutors, as the representivity in the higher ranks is 
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 But the NPA’s commitment to representivity in the 
prosecution service is tempered by the desire to keep skilled staff. A balance 
between skills and representativness is pursued.
293
     
 
e) Poor image  
Another reason for prosecutors to resign from their office might be the fact that 
their image is still relatively poor.
294
 A poor image of prosecutors may result to 
some extent from their situation prior to the introduction of the NPA in 1998. 
For example, it was only as recently as 1979 that prosecutors were recognized 
as a professional group.
295
 Before that prosecutors were formally classed as 
legal assistants and were generally recruited from the ranks of junior clerical 
assistants.
296
 After serving only for a transitional period they were often 
promoted to serve on the magisterial bench.
297
 Although prosecutors were 
professionally under the control of an attorney general, in practice magistrates 
had administrative control over them as regards promotions, leave and 
transfers.
298
 This did not only negatively impact on the prosecutorial 
independence; it often resulted in a subservient position of prosecutors to 
magistrates.
299
 Prosecutors, for example, had to approach the senior magistrate 
for permission to make long distance phone calls. Magistrates were also 
favoured concerning office space and office equipment, parking facilities 
etc.
300
 After 1995 these ‘unofficial disparities’ were exacerbated  
‘by the fact that magistrates were removed from the public service co-
ordinating bargaining council with the result that the magistrate’s 
profession could negotiate considerable salary increases directly with 
the [J]ustice [D]epartment. The widening salary gap between 
magistrates and prosecutors further served to diminish the stature of the 
latter.’
301
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Further aspects negatively affected the image of prosecutors. Not all 
prosecutors had legal qualifications.
302
 In some rural areas police officers, 
whose public image was/is generally poor, assumed the role of prosecutors.
303
  
Moreover, there was only a small degree of organisation of prosecutors in their 
public appearance and no participation in wider public debates such as on 
access to justice or the protection of human rights.
304
    
With the introduction of the NPA many of the aspects that contributed to the 
negative image of prosecutors were dispelled. However, the image of 
prosecutors still suffers from pre-1998 arrangements. Moreover, the low 
experience level of the average prosecutor may result in some cases in 
unprofessional court appearance and insufficient performance which then 
negatively reflect on the image of the prosecution service as a whole.    
 
2. Shortage of prosecutors  
The loss of experience in the prosecution service with its several reasons is an 
essential factor of the insufficient performance of the prosecution service. 
Another aspect that disturbs the prosecuting performance is the shortage of 
prosecutors. The high workload of prosecutors can reduce the quality of their 
work and increase the risk of wrong decisions. The high workload is 
aggravated by the fact that there are not enough prosecutors in charge. In this 
context the high vacancy rate of 23.6% is a matter of concern.
305
 Especially the 
fact that in most district courts there is still only one prosecutor assigned to is 
negatively impacting on the prosecutorial performance.
306
 The NPS has 
employed ‘32 senior public prosecutors whose only function is to visit areas 
where there are problems in order to assist existing prosecutors at court.’
307
 But 
this measure is just a temporary effect. Therefore the NPA has to fill its 
vacancies, especially in its core institution – the prosecution service. 
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3. Support and equipment  
The prosecuting performance is also negatively affected if prosecutors do not 
receive the necessary support in their work.    
In the literature it was argued that the office equipment of prosecutors was 
insufficient in terms of (cell-) phones, fax and copy machines, legal 
commentaries, and computers with access to online court decisions and law 
journals.
308
 The Annual Report 2003 of the NPA still mentioned this aspect as 
a challenge.
309
 Moreover, it was argued in the literature that prosecutors 
received too little administrative and clerical support and that the 
communication and the transfer of information and data between the entities of 




In the Annual Report 2005/06 of the NPA several measures are mentioned that 
aim to improve the situation of prosecutors in this regard. Under the auspices 
of the Corporate Services Division several service centres have been 
established. The Finance and Procurement Service is responsible, for example, 
for providing prosecutors with vehicles and computer hardware.
311
 The 
Information Management service, for example, has handled, scanned, indexed 
and filed documents, invoices and files and trained document practitioners and 
other staff working with documents in the NPA.
312
 Moreover, this service 
entity provides a call centre and telecommunication offices.
313
 The Research 
and Policy Information Service, for instance, provides prosecutors with library 
and information services, such as a monthly Juta Law Report content update or 
training in the use of legal online data bases (LexisNexus, Juta).
314
               
All these service are a considerable support for prosecutors, provided that they 
are accessible to all of them.  
 
 
                                                
308
 Schönteich op cit (note 4), pp. 131 f.  
309 NPA Annual Report 2003, p. 9. 
310
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311
 NPA Annual Report 05/06, p. 56. 
312
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4. Training  
A further aspect that challenges the NPA is the training of prosecutors.
315
 
After the establishment of the National Prosecuting Authority, the training of 
aspirant prosecutors has considerably improved. Previously applicants were 
appointed and started immediately to work and had to learn by trial and 
error.
316
 After a while, sometime after more than a year, they where offered 
six-week-training courses at the Pretoria-based Justice College.
317
 In the 
literature
318
 this was identified as a huge problem, as the scope of university 
law courses is more theoretical and important aspects of prosecuting, such as 
the practical application of law and court room procedure are secondary.      
Since the late 1990s aspirant prosecutors are obliged to attend and pass a six 
month training course before being permanently appointed as prosecutors.
319
 A 
one-month theoretical course at the Justice College is followed by a five-month 
practical course that includes on-the-job training inside a courtroom where new 
prosecutors are trained and assisted by an experienced training prosecutor.
320
 It 
is aspired to keep the ratio of new prosecutors to trainers low in order to allow 
for personal interaction between the trainee prosecutors and their tutor.
321
 This 
relatively new training of aspirants is an important step to increase the 
performance of the prosecution service.        
Permanent prosecutors are offered advanced training courses with regard to 
special matters, such as sexual offences.
322
 The Human Resource Management 
and Development Entity of the Corporate Service Division has compiled 
training and development plans for prosecutors. Due to budgetary constraints 
they could only be implemented at a level of 35%.
323
 Because experience is 
lacking among prosecutors, training in general and with regard to specialisation 
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 NPA Annual Report 05/06, p. 44 and p. 28. 
323 NPA Annual Report 05/06, p. 55 and p. 28; an additional third (842 prosecutors) were 
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is important. Therefore the NPA should undertake all efforts to train all of its 
permanent prosecutors.     
 
5. Changes in the legal environment  
Changes in the legal environment have impacted on prosecutorial work in the 
way that they made it more onerous and difficult.
324
  
The South African Constitution guarantees every accused the right to fair trial, 
including the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, to remain silent 
and not to testify during the proceeding.
325
 Consequently, in any criminal trial, 
‘the onus is on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.’
326
 
Although this right had also long been recognised by South African common 
law,
327
 before 1994 several legal provisions were in force that 
‘sought to assist the state in the prosecution of certain offences. These 
laws created presumptions in the state’s favour by placing an onus on 
persons accused of certain crimes that they had to rebut by proof on a 
balance of probabilities to be aquitted of the charges against them. The 
effect of such presumptions was to impose a “reverse onus” on an 
accused to disprove an essential element of the criminal charge against 
him. Failure to do so, even where reasonable doubt existed about guilt, 




After 1994 the Constitutional Court declared several of these presumptions 
invalid and unconstitutional.
329
 For example, the Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Act No 140 of 1992 provides that, if an accused is found in the possession of 
more than 115 grams of dagga (cannabis), it is presumed that he was dealing in 
cannabis and he will be convicted unless he can prove the contrary.
330
 The 
Constitutional Court held that this section infringed the right of an accused to 
be presumed innocent and was therefore unconstitutional.
331
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The abolition of legal presumptions affected furthermore the Criminal 
Procedure Act No 51 of 1977,
332
 the Arms and Ammunition Act No 75 of 
1969
333
 and the General Law Amendment Act No 62 of 1955
334
 concerning the 
possession of stolen goods.
335
    
 
Another crucial field of legislative changes is the law as it is applied to the 
granting and denial of bail to accused person. In 1995 section 60 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act No 55 of 1977
336
 was amended to ‘fit the 
constitutional norm in section 25(2)(d) of the interim Constitution’
337
 which 
guaranteed every person arrested for alleged commission of an offence the 
right to be released from detention with or without bail, unless the interest of 
justice required otherwise. In the amendment ‘legislature did not set out a 
closed list of instances defining “interest of justice” but left the list open-ended 
to leave room for judicial interpretation.’
338
 The 1996 final Constitution 
tightened the right to bail to some extent. Where the interim Constitution 
recognised a right to be released unless the interest of justice required 
otherwise, section 35(1)(f) of the final Constitution referred to the right to be 
released from detention if the interest of justice permit.
339
       
In 1997 the law of bail applications was amended again.
340
 The rape and 
murder of a six-year old girl had been the final catalyst and had strengthened 
the belief of the South African public that ‘the right to bail was to blame for the 
perceived increase in crime.’
341
 It was argued that ‘courts failed to protect 
innocent victims, by granting bail to hardened criminals to readily.’
342
 As a 
legislative response the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act No 85 of 
1997 was enacted, which restricted the discretion of judges and magistrates to 
                                                
332
 Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, section 217(1)(b)(ii).  
333
 Arms and Ammunition Act No 75 of 1969, section 40(1), as amended.  
334
 General Law Amendment Act No 62 of 1955, section 37(1), as amended.  
335 Schönteich op cit (note 4), pp. 135-138. 
336
 Hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Procedure Act. 
337
 Sarkin, J., Steyn, E., Van Zyl Smit, D. and Paschke, R. ‘The Constitutional Court’s Bail 
Decision: Individual Liberty in Crisis? – S v Dlamini’ (2000) South African Journal on Human 




 Ibid, p. 297. 
340
 Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act No 85 of 1997. 




grant bail in certain categories of offences.
343
 In the literature
344
 it is argued 
that as a further result of this legislation additional responsibilities were placed 
on the prosecutor. For example, by section 60(11)(a) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, as amended, which ‘places an onus of persons accused of serious violent 
crime to show why they should be released on bail.’ It is argued in this respect, 
that 
‘to prevent an accused from dispelling the onus, the prosecution has to 
cross-examine the accused. This is done with the purpose of showing 
that the reasons advanced by the accused to be released on bail are not 
sufficient in terms of the law to persuade the court to grant bail. To 
oppose bail successfully, the prosecution is also obliged in most cases 
to call witnesses to show that the averments of the accused are false. 
For example, the prosecution would call the investigating officer of the 
case to testify that, contrary to what the accused claims, the accused has 




Moreover, it is argued, that the 1997 amendment to the bail law has generally 





Post 1994 legislation also affected the manner in which unconvicted young 
persons could be detained whilst awaiting trial. The South African Constitution 
provides that children, that is, persons under the age of 18 years,
347
 should not 
be detained ‘except as a measure of last resort.’
348
 Section 29 of the 
Correctional Service Act No 8 of 1959 theoretically allowed ‘that juveniles as 
young as seven years of age, the minimum age of criminal capacity, could be 
held in prison.’
349
 In 1995, section 29 was therefore amended ‘to make it as 
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difficult as possible to detain children either in prison or in police cells.’
350
 But 
the newly amended law did not include any alternative arrangements for 
dealing with juveniles suspected of having committed serious offences - this 
resulted in ‘a major public outcry.’
351
 Therefore section 29 was again 
amended,
352
 and reintroduced, with some modifications, the possibility of pre-
trial detention for juveniles.
353
 But these ‘modifications’ increased the 
workload of prosecutors significantly.
354
 For example, children aged between 
14 and 18 must be kept in prisons and not in places of safety if they are 
accused of having committed serious offences.
355
 But once detained the court 
has to reconsider its detention order every 14 days.
356
 For this purpose the 
prosecution must present oral evidence on the risk of the child of absconding, 
the risk the child could pose to other children awaiting trial in a place of safety, 
and the disposition of the accused child to commit offences.
357
     
 
In 1995 the Constitutional Court ruled that police dockets were not only 
privileged information to the prosecution and that an accused person’s right of 
fair trial
358
 incorporated the right of getting access to information in the 
dockets.
359
 The court held that  
‘[o]rdinarily an accused person should be entitled to have access to the 
documents in the police docket which are exculpatory (or which are 
prima facie likely to be helpful to the defence) unless, in very rare 
cases, the State is able to justify the refusal of such access on the 




The right to fair trial includes access to the statements of witnesses and to 
information that are ‘relevant in order to enable an accused person properly to 
exercise that right.’
361
 The State may resist a claim by the accused to any 
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particular document in the police docket on the grounds that it is not justified 
for the purpose of a fair trial or on the ground that the State  
‘has reason to believe that there is a reasonable risk that access to the 
relevant document would lead to the disclosure of the identity of an 
informer or State secrets or on the grounds that there is a reasonable 
risk that such disclosure might lead to the intimidation of witnesses or 
otherwise prejudice the proper ends of justice.’
362




 it is argued that this ruling has made prosecutorial work 
more onerous and difficult. For example, it is argued that as a consequence of 
the ruling prosecutors spend now considerable time on photocopying parts of 
the dockets on request of the defence.
364
 This time-consuming task cannot 
always be delegated to clerks, because prosecutors often have to decide what 
information can be given to the defence and what remains privileged.
365
 
Moreover, it is argued that the ruling opened the possibility of misuse to 
accused persons and their defence, for instance in influencing a witness not to 
testify, or in trying to produce inconsistencies between the oral testimony of 
the witness in court and the statement the witness gave to the police.
366
     
 
With regard to the changes in the legal environment it can be concluded that 
although most of the changes seem to be more than justified against the 
backdrop of the human rights spirit of the South African Constitution, they 
have made prosecutorial work more onerous and difficult. 
 
6. Police work  
A successful prosecution depends considerably on a proper investigation of the 
police. If, for example, no, incomplete or inaccurate statements are taken from 
potentially corroborating witnesses or where evidence is obtained in an illegal 
manner, the likeliness that a guilty accused is acquitted arises. Although a good 
prosecutor may identify flawed investigation before a case goes to court the 
fact that he often needs to double-check the police investigation is time-
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consuming. Moreover, since most legal presumptions have been abolished
367
 
prosecutors have become increasingly reliant on sound and proper 
investigations.
368
   
In the literature it is argued that several developments in the post-1994 period 
negatively affected the quality of police work.
369
 The newly formed South 
African Police Service (SAPS) was challenged, for instance, by the integration 
of the several homeland police forces into its new organisational structure and 
by the human rights spirit of the new Constitution.
370
 The Bill of Rights, for 
example, guarantees the accused’s right to fair trail
371
 which demands that 
investigations are undertaken in a procedurally and legally correct manner. In 
the pre-1994 era this right had not always been adhered to.
372
 Moreover, the 
SAPS lost a considerable number of experienced officers because of poor pay, 
transformational problems, increased dangerous working conditions, and 
lucrative offers in the private security sector.
373
   
Apart from the internal problems of the SAPS, which have to be addressed by 
the SAPS itself, it is worth considering whether a closer co-operation between 
prosecutors and the police as required, for example, under the NCPS
374
 and the 
prosecution policy
375
 is sufficient enough to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system. The success of the prosecution-
led-investigation-approach in the DSO and the investigating directorates poses 
the question, whether this approach should not be extended to the whole 
relation between prosecutors and the police and stipulated accordingly.
376
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IX. Challenges facing the South African Prosecution Service 
The National Prosecuting Authority has recognised most of the problems in the 
prosecutorial sector and has taken measures to address them accordingly. The 
fact that overtime work of prosecutors is now rewarded again and that the 
salary of prosecutors is now somewhat connected to their performance is a 
positive signal. The employment of administrative staff and the various 
services offered by the Corporate Services Division allow prosecutors to focus 
more on their core functions. The introduction of obligatory training courses 
for aspirant prosecutors is a very positive reform.  
But despite all these steps the performance of the prosecutorial sector is still 
not efficient enough. Therefore the essential question is: What else has to be 
changed in the prosecutorial sector in order to increase its performance and to 
make the fight of South African criminals more successful?  
In the literature
377
 several reasons are mentioned why reforms in the 
prosecutorial sector should be easier to execute than in other sectors of the 
criminal justice system. For example, the prosecution service is compared to 
other criminal justice departments, relatively small. While the South African 
Police Service employs around 125,000 people and some 30,000 people work 
within the Department of Correctional Services, there are less than 2,500 
prosecutors and state advocates in the prosecution service.
378
 Therefore, it is 
argued, that ‘personnel-related and transformational problems should be more 
manageable and quicker to address in the prosecution service’ than in the 
police or the correctional services.
379
 Moreover, the prosecution service is 
staffed predominantly with academically qualified personnel, who have the 
attributes of university graduates: ‘a high level of theoretical training, the 
ability to learn and work independently, discipline, and above-average levels of 
intelligence.’
380
 Finally, the introduction of the NPA has given prosecutors a 




                                                
377









1. Better and diversified salaries  
The high turnover within the prosecution services will not stop as long as 
people with the same legal qualification as prosecutors earn up to three times 
more than prosecutors. Although South Africa is still a developing country 
with limited financial resources, in the literature
382
 there are several reasons 
given why even significant increases of prosecutors’ salaries are affordable. 
For example, while no discernible military or naval threat exist, the huge 
amount of money spent for defence force equipment could be reduced in order 
to increase the salary of prosecutors.
383
  
In the literature it is also argued that the objection that prosecutors as public 
servants can only receive salary increases if they were granted to all other 
public servants of similar rank can be refuted.
384
 Significant salary increases 
would be a crucial contribution to keep experienced prosecutors in the service 
which would increase the prosecuting performance. An effective and efficient 




 deterrent purposes and 
contributes therefore to a reduction of crime – a goal that is prioritised by the 
vast majority if South Africans. Additionally, the salary of prosecutors is low 
compared to their private sector peers, where skills of experienced prosecutors 
are highly in demand.
387
 This is different to most other public servants.     
Moreover, it is not comprehensible, why the salary of magistrates exceeds that 
of prosecutors more than thrice. The minimum educational or legal 
qualification required for prosecutors and magistrates are the same.
388
 The 
responsibility of the two professions is more or less the same; the workload of 
prosecutors might be higher.
389
 In Germany, just as in most other continental 
law systems, the salaries of prosecutors and judges are exactly the same.
390
 In 
some respect prosecutors have even fewer duties compared to prosecutors in 
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386
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South Africa. The management of the court’s roll is, for example, in Germany 
allocated to the judge of the prevailing court.    
In the literature
391
 it is also suggested that in order to receive additional funds 
that court buildings could be sold to private sector companies which then rent 
them back to the state. In the short term this would create additional funds, but 
in the long term it is generally cheaper to be the owner than to be the 
leaseholder. Therefore this proposal has its risks.    
The new performance based salary concept of the NPA is a first step in order to 
reward ambition and competence of prosecutors. To be a significant 
contribution this concept should include performance targets for each 
prosecutor taking his qualifications, skills, workload, experience etc into 
account, as well as the types of crimes he is prosecuting, for example serious 
economic offences. The remuneration should be in accordance with these 
targets. Additionally remuneration should be granted with regard to regional 
differences.
392
 Prosecutors working in cities have, for example, higher living 
costs than prosecutors in rural areas. At the same time tempting lucrative job 
offers in the private sector are predominant in city areas.    
 
2. Career management 
With the introduction of the NPA new ranks such as senior and chief 
prosecutor, deputy national director and national director have been 
established.
393
 Moreover, specialised positions, such as those of investigating 
director or special director, have been created; specialised units, such as the 
Asset Forfeiture Unit or the Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit, have been 
introduced. Therefore, it can be argued that now a wider choice of career paths 
is available for prosecutors than prior to 1998.
394
 But as mentioned above
395
 a 
central problem has remained unchanged, promotions and substantial salary 
increases are generally combined with office-based managerial and 
administrative functions. Valuable litigation and court room skills get lost.   
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Therefore career options should be created with regard to the specialisation of 
prosecutors, for example in juvenile delinquency or intricate fraud cases. 
Moreover, regional prosecutors should be rewarded financially with higher 
salaries than district prosecutors. This would offer promotion that is not 
equated with managerial duties and takes higher skills and greater reasonability 
into account.  
Additionally it is suggested in the literature that promotions should not occur 
automatically, but only with regard to the aptitude of the applicant.
 396
 It is also 
suggested that promotions should include the possibility of demotion if the 
promoted fails in his position.
397
 While the first suggestion rewards support, 
the latter seems to be too harsh. Demotion should be limited to exceptional 
cases and softer alternatives, such as salary reductions, could be considered 
instead.   
The new established Human Resource Management and Development Service 
within the Corporate Service Division has evaluated 99% of the jobs in the 
NPA.
398
 Combined with the new performance based salary structure career 
path in the way as sketched above, should be created.
399
   
 
3. Improved training 
The above described career paths of specialisation require training courses for 
prosecutors who envision those careers. The legal environment in which 
prosecutors work changes, new jurisprudence influences their work.
400
 The 
forms of crime and the techniques of criminals, such as computer-based fraud, 
change. New medical and forensic methods appear and open new ways of 
combating crime. Special attention should be given to the cooperation with the 
police, to sharpen prosecutors’ minds for police work and possible 
                                                
396




 NPA Annual Report 05/06, p. 55. 
399 In order to increase the attractiveness of the prosecution service as an employer for new and 
permanent prosecutors, the image of the prosecution service needs also to be enhanced. In this 
regard it is suggested, for example, that ‘the prosecution service should sell itself and its 
professional staff at every opportunity with vigour and determination.’ (Compare: Schönteich 
op cit (note 4), p. 191)  
400




 This would, for example, help to identify mistakes in 
advance and could avoid that such mistakes cause serious problems during the 
trial. Additionally prosecutors need knowledge of how to handle the huge 
amount of cases that is flowing in.
402
 This would allow, for example, an 
assessment of how long trial will last and how the court diary consequently 
should be structured. Finally different working areas require different skills. A 
juvenile prosecutor, for instance, also needs some educational knowledge and 
social skills. Training courses have to take all these aspects into account and 
have to be offered on a regular basis. The fact that at the moment only 35% of 
prosecutors receive training
403
 means, that even were such courses are in place 
only a third of prosecutors can benefit from them.
404
     
 
4. Reducing the workload of prosecutors  
In order to increase the performance of the prosecution service it is important 
to reduce the workload of prosecutors. Several measures can be identified in 
this respect.   
 
a) More prosecutors, administrative assistance 
The fact that in 2005/06 more than 20% of posts within the NPA were vacant is 
a matter of concern that directly effects on the prosecuting performance. 
Vacant posts have to be filled immediately. Thereafter, it can be determined 
whether additional prosecutors and staff have to be employed. Although both 
measures require financial means, budgetary constraints should not retard 
them. In this context the same argument applies that supports the increase of 
prosecutorial remuneration:
405
 an efficient and effective prosecutorial sector is 
a cornerstone in South Africa’s fight against crime. It requires therefore 
financial priority.  
                                                
401
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As a further measure, it should be critically scrutinised where administrative 
and clerical support can be increased, in order to relieve prosecutors from as 
many administrative duties as possible. This will allow prosecutors to spend 
their valuable time on their core function, prosecuting. In the literature it is also 
suggested that internships of senior law students during vacation time should 
be used to a greater extent.
406
 This idea rewards support as law students can 
profit from the practical insights augmenting their theoretical lectures and may 
become potential recruits for the prosecution service. But it is questionable 
whether prosecutors are considerably disburdened when such students carry 
out some routine administrative duties.          
  
b)  Diversion  
Diversion is an instrument that can help to reduce prosecutorial workload and 
relieve the criminal justice system from its overload. As mentioned above
407
 
diversion is defined ‘as the channelling of prima facie cases away from the 
criminal justice system with or without conditions.’ Such conditions can vary 
from cautions or referrals to the welfare system, to participation in particular 
programmes, or reparation and restitution.
408
 Diversion can take place at 




Although not stipulated in South African law,
410
 diversion is used in the 
country. Diversion programmes have been offered in South Africa since the 
early 1990s, for example, by the National Institute for Crime Prevention and 
the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO).
411
 Domestic research indicates that 
the participation in such programmes positively affect recidivism rates. It was 
found, for example, that among 468 NICRO juvenile diversion clients country 
wide, only 6.7% re-offended within the first 12 month following their 
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participation in a diversion programme.
412
 Further benefits are entailed in the 
use of diversion: Stigmatising effects of court proceedings, especially on 
juvenile offenders, are avoided. A swift and individualized response 
contributes rehabilitation.
413
 Moreover, diversion programmes ease the 
reintegration of offenders in their social environment, especially where 
diversion programmes comprise restorative justice elements, such as family 
group conferences and there like.
414
 Finally and particularly important in the 
context of this analysis, diversion reduces the workload of the courts and 
prosecutors as diversion is less time consuming than a whole trial
415
 and spares 
financial resources, because expensive
416
 and valuable court time is saved.    
 
Despite the positive effects diversion entails, it must not be overlooked that its 
area of application is somewhat limited. Diversion requires generally a prima 
facie case – a case that is likely to result in a conviction when not diverted.
417
 
Moreover, diversion is limited to certain kinds of offenders, predominantly first 
time offenders, and to certain kinds of offences, minor or less serious in 
kind.
418
         
In the literature
419
  it is argued that in the absence of legal provisions diversion 
is not always considered where it seems to be appropriate. A diversion case 
audit was conducted by the NPA and revealed that between 1999 and 2000 
some 10,000 children had been diverted in South Africa.
420
 While in some 
regions diversion had not been practiced at all, in city areas the use of diversion 
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such as NGOs, which provide appropriate programmes.    
416 The provision of the infrastructure and personnel of the courts is quite expensive, compare 
Schönteich op cit (note 4), pp. 166 f. 
417
 Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 165. 
418
 The typical NICRO diversion programme participant is male, between 15 and 17 years of 
age, a first offender charged with a property offence, resides with his parents and is in his 2nd 
or 3rd year of secondary schooling; compare: Sloth-Nielsen, Muntingh op cit (note 412), pp. 
77, 79.  
419 Badenhorst, Conradie op cit (note 228), p. 115. 
420 Findings reported in: Mukwevho, H. ‘The role of the prosecutors in enabling diversion’ 




 Among the various reasons that contributed this 
finding a lack of awareness of the existing programmes among prosecutors and 
a lack of training for prosecutors on diversion were identified.
422
 As a result of 
these findings, it was proposed to offer training for prosecutors across the 
country and to revise the policy directives in place.
423
  
In the absence of legal provision the decision whether or not to divert a case 
rests almost exclusively with the prosecutor.
424
 The NDPP has issued ‘Policy 
Directives on Diversion’ that set out criteria and a procedure for the use of 
diversion.
425
 Accordingly prosecutors should not consider diversion in cases 
where an offender is charged with serious offences, such as rape, murder and 
robbery with aggravating circumstances. Recidivists who have been already 
subjected to diversion are generally excluded from diversion.
426
 In order to be 
subjected to diversion, an offender should have a fixed address, should have 
accepted responsibility for his actions, should be prepared to participate in the 
diversion programme, and should, when he is a minor, be between the ages of 
12 to 18 and with a parent or guardian who is prepared to take responsibility 
for his attendance.
427
    
If a candidate meats the criteria mentioned above, the prosecutor subjects him 
– on the recommendation of a probation officer who has screened the candidate 
and after informing the candidate (or his parents in the case of a juvenile) about 
the procedure – to a diversion programme.
428
 When the diversion programme is 
completed the social worker submits a report to the prosecutor. If the offender 
has cooperated and benefited from the programme, his case is withdrawn. If 
not, the criminal trial proceeds.
429
      
                                                
421 Ibid; the fact that diversion is applied unevenly is particularly a matter of concern as 
everyone in conflict with the law should be treated alike.   
422
 Ibid.  
423
 Ibid. 
424 The decision whether or not to prosecute is subject only to limited judicial review as the 
discussion of M v The Senior Public Prosecutor, Randburg and Another (WLD) Case no 
3284/00, unreported, by Sloth-Nielsen, J. ‘Challenging the decision not to divert’ (2000) 
Article 40 Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 1-3 indicates. 
425
 Collopy, A. et al Handy Hints Manual for Prosecutors. Policy Directives (2001), Pretoria: 
NDPP, B12 as discussed in Badenhorst, Conradie op cit (note 228), pp. 116 ff. 
426
 Badenhorst, Conradie op cit (note 228), pp. 116 f. 
427
 Ibid, p. 117. 




At the sentencing stage of a criminal trial, the court can impose a suspended 
sentence and make the participation of a specific programme one of the 
conditions of the suspension. If the offender fails to comply with that 
condition, the prosecutor can apply to the court to put the suspended sentence 
into practice.
430
    
A register is required in terms of the policy directive listing candidates, reasons 
for the decisions whether or not to divert and how the case was finally 
resolved.
431
   
In the literature the current policy directives have been criticised.
432
 It is argued 
that the selection criteria for suitable candidates are to narrow. Juveniles 
without parents or guardians willing or able to take responsibility as required 
and offenders without a fixed address are excluded.
433
 Moreover, the 
requirement that a candidate has to acknowledge accountability for his 
offence(s) before being considered for diversion is likely to infringe his 
constitutional rights.
434
 That would be true when the offender’s 
acknowledgement is used against him in the case that diversion has failed and 
the criminal trial ensues.
435
 The mentioned critic rewards unrestricted support.      
The challenge for the prosecution service with regard to diversion can be 
formulated as follows: Country-wide prosecutors have to be made aware of the 
fact that diversion is a possible response to criminal behaviour and trained 
accordingly. Diversion should be used in all deserving cases as its use is 
supported by the several benefits discussed above. In this context the NPA 
should explore whether the relatively narrow selection criteria could not be 
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 Ibid, pp. 117, 118. 
431
 Ibid, p. 118.  
432
 Badenhorst, Conradie op cit (note 228), pp. 116 ff. 
433 Ibid, p. 117. 
434
 Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the right to remain silent 
(section 35(1)a. of the South African Constitution), every accused person has the right to fair 
trial, including the rights to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to testify during 
proceedings (section 35(3)h. of the South African Constitution).     
435
 Badenhorst, Conradie op cit (note 228), p. 117. 
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c) Plea and sentence agreements 
In the context of measures and instruments that help to reduce the workload of 
prosecutors and the courts, the use of plea and sentence agreements is a further 
option that has to be considered.  
The procedure that results in a plea agreement is commonly known as plea 
bargaining and can be defined ‘as a negotiation between the prosecution and an 
accused … in which the accused agrees to plead guilty to a criminal charge in 
exchange for concessions by the prosecution.’
436
 While the accused 
relinquishes his right to go to trial and loses any chance of an acquittal, he 
avoids ‘conviction on a more serious charge or receives an undertaking by the 
prosecution not to propose a harsh sentence for the accused’.
437
 The 
prosecution, in contrast, is not forced to go through a long and costly trial with 
all of its attendant evidentiary risks.
438
  
‘Informal’ plea bargaining has already taken place in South African courts 





Section 105A has codified most aspects of the informal practice and has 
additionally introduced some innovations.
441
 Unlike the traditional model, 
section 105A also allows for agreements between the prosecution and the 
defence with regard to the sentence that should be imposed.
442
 A prosecutor 
who is authorised in writing by the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
and a legally represented accused may negotiate and enter into an agreement 
before the trial commences.
443
 Agreements can be reached in respect of- 
‘(i) a plea of guilty by the accused of the offence charged or to an 
offence of which he or she may be convicted on the charge; and 
(ii) if the accused is convicted of the offence to which he or she has 
agreed to plead guilty- 
(aa) a just sentence to be imposed by the court; or 
(bb) the postponement of the passing of sentences in terms of 
section 297(1)(a); or 





 Bekker, P. M., Geldenhuys, T., Joubert, J.J., Swanepoel, J. P., Terblanche, S. S., van der 
Merwe, , S. E. Criminal Procedure Handbook 7th edit. (2005) Cape Town: Juta, p. 206. 
439 Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, as amended by section 2 of the Criminal Procedure 
Second Amendment Act No 62 of 2001.  
440
 Bekker et al op cit (note 438), pp. 206 f; Du Toit et al op cit (note 164), p. 15-6.  
441 Bekker et al op cit (note 438), p. 207.  
442 Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, as amended, section 105A(1)(a)(ii)(aa), 
443
 Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, as amended, section 105A(1)(a). 
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(cc) a just sentence to be imposed by the court, of which the 
operation of the whole or any part thereof is to be suspended in 
terms of section 297(1)(b); and 





The executive summary of the South African Law Reform Commission’s 
(SALRC) fourth interim report on the ‘simplification of criminal procedure’ 
states with the regard to the advantages of introducing plea and sentence 
agreements to South African law:  
‘A system which formalises plea agreements and which makes the 
outcome of the case more predictable will make it easier for 
practitioners to permit their clients who are guilty to plead guilty. 
Protection of the victim against publicity and against having to be 
subjected to cross-examination has also become a sensitive issue. Plea 
agreements may limit such exposure. The practice of plea negotiation in 
South Africa could therefore make an important contribution to the 




In the literature the use of plea and sentence agreements is not without 
controversy.
446
 Concerns are uttered, for example, that plea and sentence 
agreements may result in lenient sentences for the accused and that this is 
likely to undermine the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions and the 
perception of the criminal justice system as a whole.
447
 Although these 
concerns have a point, the fact that the South African criminal justice system is 
currently so heavily overloaded makes it unavoidable to utilise plea and 
sentence agreements as expedient and efficient instruments to deal with 
criminal cases. Moreover, it can be argued that the long time it takes currently 
to finalise trials and the huge backlog of cases even stronger undermine the 
perception of the criminal justice system and its deterrent effect. 
The introduction of section 105A seems to have positively impacted on the 
level of the specialised commercial crime courts. Here it is reported for the 
period of 2003/04 that in more than 60% of their cases the accused person 
entered into a plea and sentence agreement and considerable sentences had 




 South African Law Reform Commission Fourth Interim Report – Project 73 – 
Simplification of Criminal Procedure (Sentence Agreements) May 2001, Pretoria: SALRC, 
executive summary section 6. 
446
 De Villiers, W. ‘Plea and sentence agreements in terms of section 105A of the Criminal 






 On the level of the NPS the picture is completely different. In 
2005/06 in only 1,202 cases plea and sentence agreements have been 
achieved,
449
 while the NPS finalised a total of 414,282 cases in the same 
period.
450
 One might argue that the high use of plea and sentence agreements in 
the specialised commercial crime courts results predominantly from the 
‘special’ conditions under which these courts work. Such courts are staffed 
with prosecutors trained and specialised in commercial crimes. Moreover, 
commercial crime cases are more open to plea and sentence agreements as their 
investigation is intricate, evidence often hard to obtain and accused are 
normally well represented. Nevertheless, the little use of plea and sentence 
agreements on the NPS level is of concern as the pressure on courts’ rolls is 
here particularly high and plea and sentence agreements should be used to 
address this pressure.  
In the literature it is argued that some of the provisions of section 105A limit 
the advantages of plea and sentence agreements considerably.
451
 For example, 
agreements under section 105A are only open to legally represented accused.
452
 
In this context it is argued that ‘in the light of Legal Aid Board’s policy of not 
assisting accused persons with minor offences such as common assault’ 
indigent accused will only enter into plea and sentence agreements where they 
are charged with more serious offence.
453
 This is regrettable as ‘minor 
offences’ constitute a considerable part of the courts’ rolls.                  
Only prosecutors who have been authorised by the NDPP are allowed to enter 
into plea and sentence agreements.
454
 This, it is said, constitutes a problem in 
small branch courts where ‘ordinary’ prosecutors find only a small number of 
authorised prosecutors,
455
 if any, in place that they can approach for 
permission.
456
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 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa Annual Report 2003/04, p. 15 as cited in: 
Watney, M. ‘Judicial Scrutiny of plea and sentence agreements’ Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrkaanse Reg, 2006, Issue 1, 224-230, p. 224.     
449
 Annual Report 05/06, p. 27. 
450
 Ibid, p. 19. 
451
 Van der Want, M. And Gault, C. ‘Why plea bargaining may not produce the desired results’  
(2005) Without Prejudice Vol. 5, Issue 4, 20-22, p. 21. 
452
 Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, as amended, section 105A(1)(a). 
453
 Van der Want, Gault op cit (note 451), p. 21.  
454
 Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, as amended, section 105A(1)(a). 
455 According to Van der Want, Gault op cit (note 451), p. 21 the NDPP has authorised 
directors, deputy directors, many chief and some senior prosecutors. (Initially only ‘the director 
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Another critic holds that the complex procedure established under section 
105A neglects to some extent the realities in South African courts:  
‘In the view of the perception that dockets are frequently not available 
when cases come before court, the charge sheets have not been drawn 
up at the third or fourth appearance for plea and trial, prosecutors do not 
read the dockets before the hearings and so forth, it is fair to say that the 
system will be hard pressed to cope with the added burden of 
negotiating section 105A agreements…’
457
                
 
The question is which conclusion can be drawn from the finding that section 
105A apparently does not have the desired impact with regard to one of its 
presumed advantages – to reduce the pressure on courts’ rolls. It is argued that 
‘if the prosecution were competent and trustworthy, more prosecutors could be 
entrusted to enter into section 105A agreements.’
458
 This relates directly to one 
of the above mentioned central problem within the prosecution service, the lack 
of qualified and experienced prosecutors especially in the lower ranks.
459
 It is 
also argued that in a criminal justice system where ‘competent and trustworthy’ 
prosecutors are in place plea and sentence agreements could be concluded 
informally, as such prosecutors and the presiding officer ‘will ensure that 
justice prevails when such agreements are made.’
460
  
Currently, South Africa is in not in such a situation. But the procedure laid 
down in the various subsection of 105A must only be followed where an 
agreement is concerned that relates to the plea as well as the sentence.
461
 
Where only a plea agreement is concerned, section 105A is not applicable, but 
‘the “ordinary” rules of traditional plea bargaining and prosecutorial 
acceptance of pleas.’
462
           
Another question is whether the ‘traditional’ from of plea bargaining remains a 
coequal option. That is because the willingness of an accused to engage in a 
                                                                                                                              
of public prosecutions and certain prosecutors in respect of the high court, regional court and 
district court in the city which is the seat of the high division concerned’ had been authorised 
by the NDPP, compare: Directives issued by the NDPP on 14 March 2002 as printed in: Du 
Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (Service 35, 2006), Cape Town: Juta, 
15-24 to 15-26, p. 15-26. 
456
 Van der Want, Gault op cit (note 451), p. 21. 
457
 De Villiers op cit (note 446), p. 255. 
458 Ibid, p. 254.  
459
 See above, VIII.1. 
460
  De Villiers op cit (note 446), p. 254 f; De Villiers mentions Canada, as an example where 
informal agreements are successfully allowed.   
461 Du Toit et al op cit (note 164), p. 15-6.  
462
 Ibid, pp. 15-6 f. 
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negotiation in the traditional way might be limited where a further option is 




The challenge for the prosecution service in terms of plea and sentence 
agreements can be formulated as follows: Prosecutors have to be trained in the 
use of the demanding provisions of section 105A. While remembering the 
‘special’ situation of the specialised commercial crime courts, their 
considerable numbers in the use of plea and sentence agreements indicate the 
potential for the ‘ordinary’ prosecutorial level. If prosecutors are better trained 
and ‘trustworthy’ the NDPP might authorise more prosecutors to enter in plea 
and sentence agreements. Finally, it should be considered whether the 
limitation of section 105A that only legally represented accused may enter plea 
and sentence agreements should not be repealed or at least restricted to serious 
crimes where long sentences are to be expected.
464
 Under section 105A(6) the 
court is obliged to satisfy himself of the guilt of the accused on the facts and in 
law. Section 105A(7) requires that the court has to satisfy himself that the 
sentence agreement is just. These two requirements seem to be sufficient 
safeguards against misuse of plea and sentence agreements to the prejudice of 
unrepresented accused.               
 
d) Outsourcing  
As a further measure to reduce prosecutorial workload it is suggested in the 
literature to outsource functions and duties that not necessarily have to remain 
in the prosecution service.
465




                                                
463
 The final decision whether the sentence agreed upon will be imposed, also rests under 
section 105A with the court, section 105A(8), (9).   
464 De Villiers op cit (note 446), p. 254 argues that the requirement under section 105A that an 
accused has to be legally represented contravenes an accused’s right to remain unrepresented 
(to waive his right to counsel).   
465
 Schönteich, M., Minnaar, A., Mistry, D., Goyer, K.C. ‘Private Muscle – Outsourcing the 
Provisions of Criminal Justice Services’ (2004) ISS Monograph No 93, Pretoria: Institute for 
Security Studies, Chapter 5; Schönteich op cit (note 4), pp. 172 ff. 
466
 NPA Act, section 38(1), as amended:  
‘The National Director my in consultation with the Minister, and a Deputy National 
Director or a Director may, in consultation with the Minister and the National 
Director, on behalf of the state, engage, under agreement in writing, persons having 
suitable qualifications and experiences to perform service in specific cases.’  
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The idea of outsourcing prosecutorial functions and duties is based on the 
general philosophy that underlies the contracting out of state services and 
public-private partnership arrangements. It is presumed that the delivery of 
service through state entities has generally some shortcomings, while 
outsourcing such services to the private sector entails benefits.
467
 Such benefits 
can comprise lower costs, higher service quality and a more flexible and 
innovative service provision.
468
 It is argued, for example, that private 
contractors are not bound by public service labour regulations. This, it is said, 
allows for a more flexible personnel management which positively impacts on 
their ability to respond to new challenges.
469
 It is also argued that private 
service providers are normally subjected to competition for winning customers, 
which is likely to result in innovation, better quality and cost reductions.
470
 A 
further argument, for example, holds that the state can set down minimum 
standards in an outsourcing contract and change the contractor if he fails to 
comply with this standard - an option that does not exist when the service 
remains in a state department.
471
     
Although some of the presumed benefits of privatization are controversial
472
 
and concerns are uttered against privatisation,
473
 it is submitted that in certain 
cases and with appropriate safeguards outsourcing might be an appropriate 
instrument to tackle problems existing in state departments and their provision 
of service. 
With regard to the outsourcing of prosecutorial functions and duties several 
suggestion are made. For example, it is argued that cases such as computer 
related fraud cases, complex commercial crimes or environmental offences 
could be contracted out to the private sector – to law firms specialised in the 
                                                                                                                              
In terms of section 38(3), the consultation of the Minister is dispensable. Section 38(4) states 
that ‘”services” include the conducting of a prosecution under the control and direction of the 
National Director, a Deputy National Director or a Director, as the case may be.’      
467 Schönteich et al op cit (note 465), pp. 17 ff.; Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 172. 




 Ibid, p. 18. 
471
 Ibid, p. 19. 
472 For example, it is questioned whether outsourcing automatically leads to cost reductions. 
This is, for example, because some services, such as the rehabilitation of offenders are 
complicated, if at all, to compare (Schönteich et al op cit (note 465), p. 18).     
473
 Concerns with regard to privatisation comprise, for example, security risks, accountability 





 Such cases, it is said, require special knowledge, such as 
adequate knowledge of forensic accounting, computer science or natural 
sciences in order to be prosecuted successfully.
475
 The suggestion has a point 
as such knowledge is normally acquired through experience – a feature that is 
currently lacking in the system.
476
                  
The NPA’s policy in this respect is two folded. The Specialised Commercial 
Crime Unit (SCCU) has already made use ‘of private legal counsel’ to 
successfully prosecute particularly difficult and complicated commercial 
crimes tried at the specialised commercial crime courts and to allow ‘the 
transfer of skills from private counsel to state advocates.’
477
 The money for 
such outsourcing is acquired from a trust fund which is supplied with money 
donated by the private sector, especially banks and other financial 
institutions.
478
          
Apart from this use of private sector elements, the NPA’s approach with regard 
to complex cases that require special knowledge and abilities is specialisation. 
For example, four dedicated Tax Units have been introduced ‘to manage and 
oversee the prosecution of all tax related cases.’
479
   
 
It is also suggested in the literature that the temporary increases of incoming 
cases should be responded by outsourcing them to ‘articled clerks and junior 
attorneys in the private sector.’
480
 Such temporary increase, for example, may 
result from the fact that ‘certain crimes have a seasonal prevalence’, such as an 
increase ‘of drunk-driving, shoplifting, assault and domestic violence cases’ 
over the festive season between Christmas and new year.
481
 A temporary 
increase may also result from extended crime combating operations of the 
South African police service.
482
       
                                                
474 Schönteich et al op cit (note 465), p. 62. 
475 Ibid. 
476
 Discussed above, VIII.1. 
477
 Schönteich et al op cit (note 465), p. 63. 
478
 Ibid.  
479 NPA Annual Report 2005/06, p. 18; the units are based on a ‘mutual cooperation between 
NPA and South African Revenue Service (SARS) to enhance State’s capacity to prosecute 
criminal activity and collect State revenue.’     
480 Schönteich et al op cit (note 465), p. 64. 




This suggestion is less convincing as the same but probably cheaper effect 
might be achieved be installing ad hoc courts such as the additional and 
Saturday courts already known to South Africa.  
Nevertheless, the example of the SCCU demonstrates that there is potential in 
the outsourcing of special aspects of prosecutorial work. The challenge of the 
prosecution service with regard to outsourcing can therefore be formulated as 
to explore what further options exist which are suitable for contracting them 
out to the private sector.  
     
e) Private prosecution   
In the literature it is suggested that private prosecutions should be utilised as an 
instrument to reduce prosecutorial workload.
483
  
In South Africa the use of private prosecution is limited by various provisions 
of the Criminal Procedure Act. First, section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
limits the circle of potential private prosecutors. In essence, only a private 
person who ‘proves some substantial and peculiar interest in the issue of the 
trial arising out of some injury which he individually suffered in consequence 
of the said offence’ may institute and conduct a private prosecution. While 
section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act opens the institution of private 
prosecution for public bodies on certain conditions, there is no such provision 
for companies and legal persons.
484
  
A further limitation is that private prosecutions may only be instituted and 
conducted where a director of public prosecutions
485
 has declined a 
prosecution.
486
 Finally, the Criminal Procedure Act includes safeguards in 
order to prevent persons from misusing the right to institute private 
prosecutions.
487
 But at the same time these provisions might prevent potential 
private prosecutors from instituting and conducting a prosecution. For 
example, a private prosecutor has to deposit money with the court as a security 
                                                
483
 Schönteich et al op cit (note 465), pp. 64 ff.; Schönteich op cit (note 4), p. 178.  
484 The subsection (1)(a)-(d) of section 7 list potential private prosecutors, but companies and 
legal persons are not mentioned.    
485
 The attorney-general mentioned in section 7 is to be construed as a director of public 
prosecutions in terms of section 45 of NPA Act. 
486 Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, sections 7(1)(a), as amended. 
487
 Schönteich et al op cit (note 465), p. 66.  
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for costs the accused person might have in respect of his defence against the 
charge brought forward by the private prosecutor.
488
 ‘Where a private 
prosecutor fails to prosecute a charge against an accused without undue delay’ 
the money is ‘forfeited to the state.’
489
 In a private prosecution, the accused can 
‘be brought before court only by way of summons;’
490
 he cannot be arrested.
491
 
Where an accused is acquitted, the court ‘may order the private prosecutor to 
pay to such accused the … costs and expenses incurred in connection with the 
prosecution ….’ Finally, where ‘a court is of the opinion that a private 
prosecution was unfounded and vexatious,’ it has to award to the accused, at 
his request, ‘such costs and expenses incurred in connection with the 
prosecution, as it may deem fit.’
492
 
The legal provisions sketched above image the traditional view of the 
individual’s right to institute a private prosecution as a 
‘”safety valve”, so to speak, in the machinery of law. It is also to some 
extent in indirect method of controlling corruption or incompetence in 




But the system of private prosecution cannot only be justified in terms of 
society’s interest in increased law enforcement. It is also justified in the 
individual’s interest in vindication of personal grievances as it allows for 
victim participation in the criminal justice system.
494
  
Notwithstanding any accused’s right of protection against unfounded and 
malicious private prosecution, the current legislation could be amended to 
allow for a greater use of private prosecutions.      
For example, it is argued that companies which spend a considerable amount of 
money on private investigators to track down frauds among their employees 
might be more than willing to pay also for an experienced and competent 
commercial lawyer to prosecute their cases.
495
 This example has a point 
especially if one considers that it is quite likely that cases would be finalised 
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 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 9(1), as amended. 
489
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490 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 12(1). 
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 Du Toit et al op cit (note 164), p. 1-9. 
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 Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, section 16(2). 
493 Bekker et al op cit (note 438), p. 65, 
494 Ibid. 
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 Schönteich et al op cit (note 465), p. 68. 
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quicker and the chances of obtaining convictions are higher. Negative publicity 
and costs resulting companies from absent employee testifying at lengthy trials 
would be kept short.
496
 Through an amendment of the current legislation such 
companies and legal persons could be permitted to institute private 
prosecutions.             
In a divided society such as South Africa one might argue with some reason 
that such allowance for private prosecution might favour the wealthy. But just 
as aptly explored in the literature
497
 private prosecutions reduce prosecutorial 
workload and allow prosecutors to engage with other cases, including cases in 
which indigent people have been victimised. Additionally, access to private 
prosecution for such people could be granted through NGOs etc.
498
      
A further shortcoming of the current system of private prosecutions is 
identified in the provision that victims of a crime are only allowed to proceed 
with a private prosecution after a director of public prosecution has declined to 
prosecute a case.
499
 Here it is argued that the decision whether to institute a 
prosecution could be left to the victim, as the victim is the person ‘who 
arguable has the most to lose from a bungled prosecution.’
500
   
To make private prosecutions more accessible in the sketched way could result 
in several advantages:  
‘By instituting private prosecutions, crime victims improve their 
chances of obtaining a speedy conviction against an accused person. 
Accused persons benefit as their trials are finalised more rapidly than 
would otherwise be the case. Frequently delays in criminal justice trials 
place considerable financial and emotional strains on accused persons 
and their families, even if the trials end in their acquittal. Finally, 
private prosecutions would alleviate some of the pressures on the state-
run prosecution system, as state prosecutors should be able to devote 




Therefore it can be concluded with regard to the use of private prosecution that 
the prosecution service should envisage the benefits of this instrument and 
lobby for legislative changes.   
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5. Making the South African criminal procedure more inquisitorial with 
regard to the role and function of the prosecution service  
Apart from the several measures that could be introduced and/or intensified to 
reduce prosecutorial workload and to address the overload of the criminal 
justice system, it might be worthy to explore whether inquisitorial features of 
criminal procedure could enhance prosecutorial work in South Africa.  
 
a) Adversarial and inquisitorial models of criminal justice 
It is submitted that 
‘[t]he most fundamental differences between systems of criminal law 
and procedure … can be characterised on a rough dimension of 
inquisitorial and adversarial systems.’
502
   
 
While the adversarial system is traditionally linked to the Anglo-American 
common law system, the inquisitorial system is linked to the continental 
European civil law system.
503
 In practice there are no two pure systems in 
existence, but hybrids which are predominantly adversarial or inquisitorial in 
nature.
504
 South Africa follows the Anglo-American adversarial system 




The central issue of a trial conducted in the inquisitorial manner differs from 
that of a trial conducted in the adversarial manner: 
‘In an adversarial trial the central determination is whether the 
prosecution can prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If 
the prosecution fails to meet this burden, whether because of negligence 
or simply a lack of evidence, the state looses its case. The presiding 
officer plays a passive role.’
506
 
                                                
502 Van Koppen, P. J. and Penrod, S. D. (eds.) Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Justice – 
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503
 Steytler op cit (note 363), p. 2. 
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‘In an inquisitorial trial within the civil law systems, the judge plays a 
much more active role. The judge, rather than the parties, is responsible 
for developing the evidence, calling or questioning witnesses himself or 
herself. In a minority of civil law jurisdictions this may include access 
to the dossier compiled prior to trial. By its nature this includes written 
statements (so that the judge is not confined to oral evidence led in 
court).’
507
   
 
Briefly stated, the features of the adversarial model comprise a public trial 
(with discretion to hold in camera hearings), oral proceedings, a passive 
presiding officer, a cross-examination of witnesses by opposing parties, a 
police run investigation, a strict system of evidence, competency requirements 
for witnesses, parties that are responsible for the presentation of evidence in 
support of their respective cases, a contest between the parties, and a 
subordination of the search for the truth to either constitutional rights or rights 
established by common law.
508
      
Under the inquisitorial model there is also a public trial (with discretion to hold 
in camera hearings) and an oral proceeding but the model differs from the 
adversarial one as it comprises an examining presiding officer, questioning of 
witnesses by that presiding officer, a prosecutor (or judicial) run investigation, 
a free system of evidence, no competency requirements for witnesses, the duty 
of all officials to search for the truth and evidence that is in support of and 
against the accused, and an inquiry to establish the truth.
509
     
In the current context two aspects are of particular interest:  
 
b) Investigating stage - prosecution led investigation 
The quality of police investigation has been identified as one of the factors that 
negatively impact on prosecutorial performance.
510
 In the literature it is argued 
that 
‘the Achilles heel of the South African criminal justice system has been 




                                                
507
 Ibid, p. 2, 3. 
508
 Ibid, p. 4, 5. 
509
 Ibid, p. 5. 
510 See above, VIII.6. 
511
 Stone et al op cit (note 36), p. 32. 
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It has further been analysed that the key to successful investigation and case 
presentation is a close collaboration between the victim,
512
 the investigating 
officer and the prosecutor.
513
 In essence this means that insufficient 
investigation of cases cannot only be blamed on the police. It is also a result of 
inadequate prosecutorial guidance. This insight is reflected in the NCPS
514
 as 
well as in the Prosecution Policy.
515
 Although both policy papers require 
collaboration between the police and prosecutors, it seems that in the light of 
the huge backlog of cases and the high numbers of cases withdrawn in court, 
present arrangement are not sufficient enough to address these problems 
adequately. 
In inquisitorial systems the prosecution service is traditionally considered to 
have a controlling role in the investigating stage.
516
 In some countries, such as 
Germany and the Netherlands, the prosecution service is legally the ‘ruler’ of 
the investigating stage.
517
 In Germany, the police are – as far as the prosecution 
of crime is concerned – functionally subservient to the prosecution service and 
in this function obliged to follow any order issued by the prosecution 
service.
518
 In many continental European systems there is at least a factual 
influence of the prosecution service at the investigation stage with regard to 
serious and moderate serious cases. Only minor offences are solely dealt with 
by the police.
519
 The influence of the prosecution service at the investigation 
stage is ‘regarded necessary because it is concerned with the gathering of 
evidence to be used before court.’
520
 The prosecution service’s role is ‘to 
ensure that necessary rules are stuck to and the evidence gathered in such a 
way to be of maximum use to the court.’
521
   
                                                
512
 The importance of victim participation is discussed further below, IX.6. 
513 Stone et al op cit (note 36), p. 32. 
514 NCPS Summary (note 179), National programme 1.4: prosecutorial policy, ibid p. 11. 
515
 Prosecution Policy (note 118), section 8. 
516
 Wade, M. ‘The Power to Decide – Prosecutorial Control, Diversion and Punishment in 
European Criminal Justice Systems Today’  in: Jehle, J.-M. and Wade, M. (eds.) Coping with 
Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems – The Rise of Prosecutorial Power Across Europe 
(2006), Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 27-126, p. 40. 
517
 Ibid; in Germany this is stipulated in sections 160 ff of the German Criminal Procedure 
Code (Strafprozessordnung) in: Schönfelder, H., Deutsche Gesetze – Textsammlung (2005), 
Munich: Beck, section 90.   
518
 Section 152(1) of the German Court Constitution Code (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) in: 
Schönfelder, H., Deutsche Gesetze – Textsammlung (2005), Munich: Beck, section 95.    
519 Wade op cit (note 516), p. 43. 




In England and Wales the prosecution service has no competence at the 
investigation stage, there is  
‘no factual involvement and the police [are] in charge of all 
investigations. The prosecution service will receive a file once the 
police decide it is ready to be handed over. The … [prosecution service] 
can naturally request further investigative action at that point. Where 
the police turn to the … [prosecution service] for advice during an 
investigation, there will be some factual … [prosecution service] 
involvement; but this is still reported to be the exception rather than the 
rule.’
522
       
 
In South Africa – just as in England and Wales and in other adversarial systems 
– the powers of the police and prosecution were traditionally strictly separated. 
As discussed above,
523
 the NPA Act has changed these arrangements to some 
extent. Directors of public prosecutions can now oblige the police to conduct 
investigations and obtain statements. But normally the police investigate on 
their own initiative.
524
 The police then submit a docket (file, dossier) to the 
prosecutor who, in his exercise of discretion to prosecute, examines the 
witnesses’ statements and the evidence contained in the docket.
525
 At this (late) 
stage the prosecutor may also direct and control the investigation by giving 
instructions to the investigating police officer; scientific analyses or further 
statements of witnesses can be requested.
526
 But the prosecutor does not 
participate in any investigative work.
527
 Formal investigating powers are 
granted to the Prosecuting Authority only through the structure of investigating 
directorates
528
 which means that effective ‘prosecution led investigation’ might 
only be possible under the shelter of these directorates.  
Although the investigating directorates have to handle the most intricate cases, 
their performance is quite impressive. For example, the Specialised 
Commercial Crimes Unit has achieved a conviction rate of around 95% over 
                                                
522
 Ibid, p. 43. 
523
 III.3.b)ee). 






 Ibid. Stone et al op cit (note 36), p. 35 report that ‘in a few of the new, coordinated Court 
Centres’ the police ‘now bring dockets to court two days in advance.’ This strongly suggests 
that this is the clear exception and cases are normally brought to court just before the trial 
commences. Prosecutors are then not able to check the docket properly. This bears the risk that 
evidentiary problems etc are only discovered within the proceeding and may result in 
withdrawals and postponements of cases.  
528




 the Directorate of Special Operations over the same period 
considerably over 80%.
530
 Although remembering the somewhat special 
circumstance these directorates work in,
531
 the use of prosecution led 
investigation can be identified as one major key to their success.  
The question that rises is why the provisions for prosecution led investigation 
should not be extended to  
‘the provincial DPP’s offices and the daily prosecution of cases in the 
District and Regional Courts … where 95 percent of the cases are 
handled … [and] the attrition rate of cases is embarrassing [?]’
532
    
 
The main concern uttered against ‘prosecution led investigation’ is that a 
prosecutor who becomes intimately involved in an investigation could become 
ethically compromised.
533
 It is argued that the  
‘separation between officials who investigate crime and those who 
decide to prosecute is an important one. It promotes objectivity and 
provides the criminal justice system with a process in terms of which 
the result of a police investigation can (to some extent) be evaluated 





In the case of the investigating directorates practical ways have been suggested 
and are followed to avoid that prosecutors involved in prosecution led 
investigation become ethically compromised: 
‘Integration or closer co-operation between the investigator and 
prosecutor should not be equated with role confusion. The distinction 
between the role of the investigator and prosecutor should not become 
blurred. The investigator is still the best person to perform the function 
of collecting the evidence. The prosecutor can review, advice and direct 
the investigator, however all the time mindful of the fact that he or she 
remains an officer of the court with certain ethical obligations. It is 
important that the prosecutor maintain a healthy distance from the 
actual gathering of evidence in order to ensure that these ethical 
obligations are not compromised. The prosecutor is there to guide the 
investigation not to do the job of the investigator. The prosecutor has at 
                                                
529
 NPA Annual Report 2005/06, p. 45. 
530
 Ibid, p. 34. 
531
 For example, prosecutors are generally specialised and experienced in their work. On the 
one hand these units focus on intricate high profile crimes, but may, on the other hand choose 
only cases where the success in form of convictions is very likely.   
532
 Stone et al op cit (note 36), p. 33. 
533 Redpath, J. ‘The Scorpions – Analysing the Directorate of Special Operations’ (2004) ISS 
Monograph No 96, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, p. 63. 
534
 Bekker et al op cit (note 438), p. 56; similar, Du Toit et al op cit (note 164), p. 1-4I.    
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all times be wary not to end up as a fact witness. There may well be 
cases where a prosecutor has become so steeped in the investigation 
that he should not prosecute that particular criminal case. By and large 
this situation can be avoided and care should be taken to do so. Failure 
to do so will result in the prosecutor being called as a witness and 
therefore precluded from conducting the prosecution, which defeats the 
purpose behind assigning the prosecutor the case from the onset.’
535
    
 
It is not comprehensible, why these arguments should not apply in the relation 
between prosecutors and investigating officers outside the shelter of 
investigating directorates. Moreover, in the continental European systems, 
where the prosecutor is by nature more an inquirer than a party, legislative 
safeguards are in place, which guarantee his objectivity.
536
 Similar arrange-
ments exist in South Africa;
537
 legislation could therefore be adopted 
accordingly. 
It is submitted that prosecution led investigation should be extended to become 
the underlying principle of the relation between police and prosecution service. 
It should be stipulated accordingly.  
 
c) A more inquisitorial role of the presiding officer – ‘assisting’ the 
prosecution 
The central idea of this thesis is that the effectiveness and efficiency of 
criminal justice system largely depends on a well functioning prosecution 
service. This is particularly true in an adversarial system such as South Africa 
that is by nature ‘party-driven.’ Prosecutors are burdened with numerous duties 
and a high workload.
538
 Moreover, most South African prosecutors lack 
experience.
539
 In this context it might by worthy to explore whether the role of 
                                                
535
 Ngcuka, B. Prosecution-lead Investigation: A practical overview, presented at 2
nd
 World 
Conference on Modern Criminal Investigation, Organised Crime and Humane Rights, Durban 
South Africa 5 December 2001, p. 13 as cited in: Redpath, J. ‘The Scorpions – Analysing the 
Directorate of Special Operations’ (2004) ISS Monograph No 96, Pretoria: Institute for 
Security Studies, p. 64, 65. 
536
 In Germany, the prosecutor is by legislation obliged to investigate the complete 
circumstances of the case, which includes not only incriminating but also exculpatory facts 
(section 160(2) of the German Criminal Procedure Code). Infringement of this duty is a 
punishable offence under section 339 of the German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, in: 
Schönfelder, H. Deutsche Gesetze – Textsammlung (2005), Munich: Beck, section 85.   
537
 As discussed above (III.5.), prosecutors are delictually liable for malicious prosecutions.  
538 Discussed above, VIII.1.c) 
539
 Discussed above, VIII.1. 
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the presiding officer should become more inquisitorial, especially when it 
comes to ‘assisting’ the prosecution. 
As mentioned above
540
 inquisitorial aspects already exist in South African 
criminal procedure law. For example, the presiding officer has the power to 
question witnesses. Furthermore, section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
empowers the court to ‘examine any person other than the accused who has 
been subpoenaed to attend such proceedings or who is in attendance of such 
proceedings,’ and to recall any witnesses who have testified. The court is 
obliged to do so if it appears ‘essential to the just decision of the case’, and 
commits an irregularity if it fails to do so.
541
 Section 186 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, in turn, ‘imposes a similar power and duty with regard to the 
calling of witnesses.’
542
           
Although judicial officers have ‘well-recognised’ inquisitorial powers of 
questioning and calling witnesses,
543
 the question has been raised whether 
these powers ‘should be expanded to ensure better truth finding’ and ‘to enable 




With regard to assisting an undefended accused, it is ‘accepted that the judicial 
officer may be more interventionist, questioning state witnesses in order to 
establish the truth.’
545
 In S v Mosoinyane
546
 the court approved that  
‘”Participation in the testing of the State evidence does not per se 
compromise the court’s impartiality. To the contrary, by remaining 
aloof where the accused is unable to test the State evidence, the judicial 
officer would actually be siding with the prosecution by letting the 





                                                
540
 IX.5.a). 
541 S v Mayiya 1997 (3) BCLR 386 (C) at 395C. 
542
 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 96 – Project 73 – Simplification 
of Criminal Procedure (A more Inquisitorial Approach to Criminal Procedure – Police 
Questioning, Defence Disclosure, the Role of Judicial Officers and Judicial Management of 
Trials), June 2001, Pretoria: SALRC, p. 18.   
543
 Steytler op cit (note 363), p. 21. 
544
 SALRC op cit (note 542), p. 113 (7.1). 
545 Steytler op cit (note 363), p. 21. 
546 S v Mosoinyane 1998 (1) SACR 583 (T).  
547
 S v Mosoinyane 1998 (1) SACR 583 (T) at 595A-C.  
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Judicial intervention in form of calling witnesses that may be of assistance to 




aa) ‘Assisting’ the prosecution  
A more complicated question is whether a judicial officer may intervene even 
where it may be to the prejudice of the defence. The issue was raised in S v 
Manicum,
549
 where the magistrate was confronted with a prosecutor who was 
either unwilling or unable to cross-examine the accused on his conflicting 
statements. The Court of appeal stated with regard to the situation of the 
magistrate:     
‘He was aware of the legal duties imposed on a judicial officer. He 
knew he could not enter the arena and cross-examine the appellant. He 
knew he could not assume the role of prosecutor and endeavour to 
establish that the appellant’s version fell to be rejected. He did ask a 
few questions. Theses were not leading questions and they were not 




The question in this context is ‘whether the court should have been so 
restricted in its intervention, which allowed a possible guilty person to walk 
free.’
551
 The question posed involves to issues: the first issue is that a court 
may not perform the function of the prosecution and, the second that the court 
may create the impression of partiality.
552
   
 
bb) A court may not perform the function of the prosecution 





 the Supreme Court of Appeal approved a previous dictum in R v 
                                                
548
 Steytler op cit (note 363), p. 22. 
549
 S v Manicum 1998 (2) SACR 400 (N). 
550 Ibid, at 404B-C. 
551
 SALRC op cit (note 542), p. 37, (5.7); The Court of appeal in S v Manicum allowed the 
appeal and set the conviction and sentence aside, after the accused had been convicted by the 
court of first instance. Although cross-examination had not been conducted, the court of first 
instance convicted the accused because his version was highly improbable while the state’s 
case was the more probable. This decision was held to be wrong by the Court of appeal. (S v 
Manicum 1998 (2) SACR 400 (N), at 404D-E).  
552 SALRC op cit (note 542), p. 37 (5.8 ff), p. 40 (5.17 ff). 
553 Steytler op cit (note 363), p. 22. 
554




 which held that the discretion and power in terms of section 247 
(now section 186 of the Criminal Procedure Act) could be exercised in favour 
either of the accused or the state, provided that this happened for the purpose of 
doing justice as between the prosecution and the accused. With regard to the 
questioning of an accused the Supreme Court of Appeal
556
 stated that a court is 
allowed to ask an accused questions even if the accused might find it difficult 
to answer them ‘without doing damage to his case’ and that this does not 
justify the perception of partiality. The same applies to questions that show that 
a witness was giving false evidence or was unconvincing.
557
              
However, S v Manicum clearly states that the judicial officer may not assume 
the role of the prosecution.
558
 This raises the question how the courts legitimate 
truth-finding role can be distinguished from performing an unacceptable 
prosecutorial function.
559
    
Some indication on how to draw this distinction can be found in case law.
560
 
For example, it was held that the purpose of section 186 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act is not to place the presiding officer in the position of the 
prosecutor by calling witnesses from the outset in order to prove the allegations 
contained in the charge sheet.
561
 On the other hand, the court may call for 
evidence which has been omitted by mistake or is necessary in order to rectify 
some technical deficiency.
562
    
Steytler suggests in his analysis of case law in the current context the following 
distinction:  
‘Where there is no evidence against an accused, an interventionist 
judicial officer would be playing the role of the prosecutor. Where it is 
apparent that there is no case for the accused to meet, the court must 
order a discharge. Where a reasonable suspicion has been established, 
but falling short of a prima facie case, it should be acceptable for the 
court to call a witness who may easily fill in the missing link. The court 
may thus perform a supplementary or complementary role to that of the 
                                                
555
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 S v Gerbers 1997 (2) SACR 601 (SCA) at 608H-J. 
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 S v Van Dyk 1998 (2) SACR 362 (W) at 379A. 
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prosecution in the interest of justice. Where there is no supplement, 
intervention would be wrong.’
563
   
 
This suggestion rewards support as it allows for judicial intervention, but limits 
this intervention at the same time. Nevertheless, in cases where it is impossible 
to distinguish that easily as outlined by Steytler it might be difficult to 





cc) The court may create the impression of partiality 
The South African Constitution requires that the judicial officer must act 
impartial.
565
 Moreover, it is established law that the conduct of a presiding 
officer must not create the impression that he is biased in favour of the 
prosecution.
566
 As searching for the truth should not per se be equated with 
bias, the question is ‘how perceived bias is established.’
567
 
The issue of bias is particularly raised ‘when it come to the judicial questioning 
of witnesses, because such intervention lends itself more easily to charges of 
bias.’
568
 The perception of partiality is not justified merely because the 
questions of the presiding officer are prejudicial to the accused.
569
 Moreover, 
the length of questioning alone is a relatively neutral factor.
570
 Important is the 
manner in which the questioning takes place: 
‘It goes without saying that objectively legitimate questions may be put 
so belligerently or intimidatingly or repetitively or confusingly as to 
amount to judicial harassment and therefore an irregularity’
571
                 
 
Judicial questioning must not amount to cross-examination
572
 and has to be 
open-minded.
573
 Dismissive attitudes towards a witness, reflected, for instance, 
                                                
563
 Steytler op cit (note 363), p. 23. 
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565 Section 9 guarantees every individual the right to equality before the law and equal 
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567
 Steytler op cit (note 363), p. 24. 
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 Steytler op cit (note 363), p. 25. 
569 S v Gerbers 1997 (2) SACR 601 (SCA) at 608H-I. 
570 Ibid, at 608G-H. 
571
 Ibid, at 608H. 
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in adverse comments on witness’s evidence, may be a legitimate part of cross-
examination, but are illegitimate in judicial questioning.
574
    
Steytler concludes that ‘the tension between truth-finding and perceptions of 
bias will always be there, but that should not preclude the court from 
performing its truth finding duty.’
575
 In S v Gerbers the Supreme Court of 
Appeal recognised this ‘potential’ tension and stated: 
‘…it remains incumbent upon all judicial officers to consistently bear in 
mind that their bona fide efforts to do justice may be misconstrued by 
one or other of the parties as undue partisanship and that difficult as it 
may sometimes be to find the right balance between undue judicial 





dd) Assuring truth-finding interventions of the courts 
The discussion of the issues that are raised when judicial officers ‘assist’ the 
prosecution clearly indicates that the courts have in terms of sections 167 and 
186 of the Criminal Procedure Act inquisitorial  powers to intervene, even 
where it is to the prejudice of the defence. The question is how it can be 
assured that these powers are actually applied where it is necessary – where a 
more truth-finding role is required to compensate the potential lack of effort 
and skill among the litigants. 
In the literature it has been suggested that legislative guidelines could help to 
implement a greater truth-finding role within the present legislative 
framework.
577
 Such guidelines, it is argued, would address the risk that judicial 
officers ‘steeped in an adversarial culture’ may not change their habits that 
easily.
578
 Moreover, ‘guided’ judicial intervention would be more protected 
against complaints of partisan behaviour.
579
  
Although guidelines might help to increase clarity in the way powers in terms 
of sections 167 and 186 of the Criminal Procedure Act are applied, it must not 
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576
 S v Gerbers 1997 (2) SACR 601 (SCA) at 607B-C. 
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be overlooked that the application of these powers finally depends upon the 
qualification and skills of the particular judge.
580
 Therefore, it seems to be 
more important to train new and current judicial officers in a more truth-
finding role that guarantees necessary intervention on the one hand and 
impartiality and fairness on the other hand.
581
 
It is also suggested that the police docket should be placed in the hands of the 
judicial officer in order to assure that the powers in terms of sections 167 and 
186 are exercised more effectively.
582
 
The SALRC argues that since the decision in Shabalala v the Attorney-
General
583
 which required the prosecution to disclose to the defence, in 
advance of the trial, in principle all material information in the docket that     
‘[t]here is no good reason why that material should not equally be 
available to the judicial officer. If it is made available to the judicial 
officer, it enables him or her to make an informed decision as to what 
evidence is available to the prosecution; the extent to which witnesses 
materially depart from previous statements; and the extent to which the 
power to call witnesses might usefully be exercised. There can be no 
prejudice to either the prosecution or the defence if the judicial officer 
is in the position of such information.’
584
   
 
Placing the complete docket or (at least) the material that has to be disclosed by 
the prosecution in the hands of the judicial officer does not mean that the 
information therein becomes automatically admissible in evidence.
585
 Facts 
still have to be proved in accordance with the rules of evidence.
586
 The risk that 
a judicial officer might be influenced by information that is not capable of 
being proved, would not be a new one. Even under current legal arrangements, 
it is not unusual that information comes to the knowledge of the judicial 
officer, from which he has to ‘disabuse the mind in reaching a conclusion.’
587
  
The SALRC argues that the safeguard that ensures that this is done lies in the 
requirement that reasons must be given for factual conclusions.
588
 Moreover, it 
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is argued that having access to information as proposed would place the 
judicial officer in no different position compared to that in which he would be 
once the prosecution has opened its case fully, as it is permitted to do by 




With regard to a more inquisitorial role of the judicial officer in order to 
‘assist’ the prosecution, it can be concluded that the discussion of case law 
strongly suggests that powers to do so already exist. As mentioned, the crucial 
point is that these powers might not always be applied where necessary. In 
order to assure truth finding interventions of the judicial officer, several 
suggestions are made in the literature. Guidelines with regard to the exertion of 
the powers in terms of sections 167 and 186 of the Criminal Procedure Act and 
specific training of judicial officers in a more truth-finding role that guarantees 
necessary intervention on the one hand and impartiality and fairness on the 
other hand are two convincing suggestions. Additionally, the arguments put 
forward in the literature to place the police docket in the hands of the judicial 
officer in order to assure that the powers in terms of sections 167 and 186 are 
exercised more effectively are convincing and reward support.   
 
6. Access to justice for Victims  
The promotion of access to justice for interested parties is an issue which 
comprises many different aspects.
590
 For the purpose of this thesis it will be 
explored how prosecutorial work and performance depends on the access to 
justice of victims of sexual offences and which consequences this dependency 
has for the prosecution service. 
Access to justice and fair treatment of victims of crime is required under the 
United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 




 General: Cappelletti; M. ‘Access to Justice as a Theoretical Approach to Law and a 
Practical Programme for Reform’ (1992) South African Law Journal Vol. 109, Issue 1, 22-39; 
in the South African context: AfriMAP and Open Society Foundation for South Africa South 
Africa – Justice Sector and the Rule of Law (2005) Newlands: Open Society Foundation for 
South Africa, pp. 108 ff; with regard to the prosecution service: Combrinck, H. ‘Access to 
Justice and the prosecutorial authority: a contradiction in terms?’ (1996) Journal for Judicial 
Science Vol. 21, Issue 2, 123-131. 
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and Abuse of Power
591
and under the South African Constitution.
592
 
Accordingly the South African Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development has issued a Service Charter for Victims of Crime
593
 and 
accompanying Minimum Standards on Services for Victims of Crime.
594
 In the 
context of this framework it is apparent that the prosecution service has a 
responsibility to promote the access of victims to criminal justice. For example, 
the Victims Charter grants the right to assistance for victims which comprises 
that  
‘The prosecutor will ensure that special measures are employed in 
relation to sexual offences, domestic violence and child support or 
maintenance matters and that, where available, such cases are heard in 
specialised courts.’
595
        
 
But apart from the obligation under the Victims Charter to provide service for 
victims, the prosecution service and the other role players in the criminal 
justice system have a particular own motivation to promote access to justice for 
victims. Victims are characterised as the ‘gate keepers’ of the criminal justice 
system, which means that the role players in the criminal justice system can 
often only become active where victims report their victimisation to the 
police.
596
 Moreover, a successful prosecution of a sexual offence perpetrator 
often requires that the necessary evidence, such as DNA of the perpetrator, is 
collected and that the victim testifies in court.  
In mid-2000 a nationwide survey on various forms of abuse committed against 
women was conducted.
597
 The aim of the survey was to understand women’s 
experiences of violence, and to determine their perception of services rendered 
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by the state to female victims of violence.
598
 The Survey focused on women’s 




The survey revealed among other findings that most abused women sought 
help from their family (60% after their most serious incident of abuse), 
followed by the police (47%), counsellors (46%), medical persons (42%), 
district surgeons (24%) and legal persons (11%).
600
 Only 3%, or 17 out of 565 
abused women who sought help during the five-year period, ended up in court 
to testify against their abuser.
601
    
What these figures illustrate is, first, that only less than a half of all abused 
women find their way to the police. Secondly, even if an abused woman has 
reported her victimisation it is very unlikely that she will testify in court. Given 
these two findings, it is corollary that the probability of being convicted is 




a) Sexual Offences and Community Affairs (SOCA) Unit  
The response of the National Prosecuting Authority to alarming findings such 
as the one described, is the SOCA Unit.
603
 The purpose of this unit is primarily 
‘to deal with the victimisation of women and children.’
604
 Therefore the unit 
co-ordinates the establishment of specialised sexual offences courts and 
formulates policy with regard to the prosecution of sexual offences.
605
 
Furthermore, the unit develops and implements community awareness 
programmes and strategies to integrate non-governmental organisation in the 
prevention and containment of sexual offences.
606
 The Unit sees its approach as 





 Ibid, Figure 3. 
601
 Ibid, comment to Figure 3. 
602 This undermines the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system.  
603
 The Unit was established through a Presidential proclamation in 1999 under section 
13(1)(c) of the NPA Act (NPA Annual Report 2005/06, p. 41).  
604
 NPA Annual Report 2005/06, p. 41. 
605 Ibid. 
606
 Ibid, p. 42. 
 90 
being more holistic than the ‘traditional’ perception of the prosecution service 
‘as simply reacting to crime by prosecuting arrested (alleged) offenders.’
607
 
The strategic objectives of the SOCA Unit comprise, among others, an 
improvement of conviction rates in cases of violence against women and 
children, the systematic reduction of secondary victimisation within the 
criminal justice system, and an increase in the diversion of child offenders 




b) Thuthuzela Care Centres  
In the context of the access to justice of victims of sexual offences the 
Thuthuzela Care Centres
609
 are of particular importance.     
Thuthuzela Care Centres are ‘one-stop facilities that have been introduced as a 
critical part of South Africa’s anti-rape strategy’ in order to ‘reduce secondary 
trauma for victims, improve conviction rates and reduce the lead time for 
finalising cases.’
610
  The Thuthuzela project is led by the SOCA Unit, in 
partnership with various donors including Vodacom, Kelloggs Foundation, 
Bhp Billiton and UNICEF.
611
 Centres are in operation in public hospitals 
situated in communities where the incidence of rape is particularly high.
612
 
They are also linked to sexual offences courts, which are staffed by 
prosecutors, social workers, investigating officers, magistrates, health 
professionals and police, and located in close proximity to the centres.
613
 The 
centres are managed by an inter-departmental team comprising Justice, Health, 
Education, Treasury, Correctional Services, Safety and Security, Local 





 Currently there are 10 Thuthuzela Care Centres operating in the following Provinces: 
Gauteng (3), Western Cape (1), Eastern Cape (2), KwaZulu-Natal (2), Northern Cape (1) and 
North West (1), Compare: Thuthuzela Care Centres: The Country’s Anti-Rape Strategy 
improve Perpetrator Conviction Rates, available at: 
http://www.npa.gov.za/ReadContent407.aspx, accessed: 01.02.2007. 
610
 Thuthuzela Care Centres: The Country’s Anti-Rape Strategy improve Perpetrator 
Conviction Rates, available at: http://www.npa.gov.za/ReadContent407.aspx, accessed: 
01.02.2007. 
611
 Ibid.  
612
 Ibid. 
613 Ibid; ideally sexual offences courts have special facilities, such as separate waiting rooms 
for victims. 
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The service offered by the centres to rape victims is described as follows: 
‘When reporting, the rape victim is removed from crowds and 
intimidating environments, such as at the police station, to a more 
victim-friendly environment before being transported by ambulance to 
the Thuthuzela one stop centre at the hospital.  
Enroute, she receives comfort and crisis counselling from a trained 
ambulance volunteer and once at the centre, she is ushered a quiet, 
private space, welcomed by the site-coordinator and a doctor 
immediately summoned to conduct a medical examination. Information 
on the procedures to be performed is then provided and the patient signs 




After the medical examination the victim  
‘is offered the opportunity to take a bath or shower and to change into 
soft, clean clothes to help cushion bruised feelings from the incident. 
After that, the investigating officer on call at the centre takes the 
victim’s statement. 
Thereafter, she receives appropriate medication and is given a follow-





The benefits of this service are apparent. As it avoids by all means secondary 
victimisation, it encourages victims to approach the Thuthuzela Centres and 
report their victimisation. The fact that all necessary role players are available 
at one location, assures that all necessary steps for a successful prosecution of 
the crime are taken, such as examining the victim and securing DNA evidence 
and taking the victims statement closely after the crime has been committed.   
Moreover, the victim may consult with a ‘specialist prosecutor’ before the case 
goes to court.
617
 A ‘victim assistant officer’ prepares the victim for the 
appearance at court; a case manager updates the victim on the trial process and 
explains the outcome of the trial.
618
 Efforts are also undertaken to make the 
described service more applicable to child victims of sexual offences.
619
 All 












these measures are important steps to increase the benefits of the service 
offered at the Thuthuzela Care Centres with regard to the service for victims 
and the successful prosecution of sexual offenders. 
 
c) Impact of the SOCA Unit and Thuthuzela Care Centres 
During the last four years the number of specialised sexual offences courts has 
increased from 22 to 67.
620
 The average conviction rate in these courts has also 
increased during the same period from 64% to 70%.
621
 Where Thuthuzela Care 
Centres are involved the average conviction rate lies with remarkable 80%; in 
Wynberg, where the sexual offences court is linked to a well established Care 
Centre, the conviction rate is 95%.
622
 These figures clearly demonstrate the 
success of the SOCA Unit and the Thuthuzela project. The success is 
confirmed by the fact that at the same time more cases have been reported to 
the police and prosecuted.
623
    
 
With regard to victims of sexual offences the challenge for the prosecution 
service can be formulated as to increase the number of specialised sexual 
offences courts and Thuthuzela Care Centres.  
In the context of sexual offences it is argued that the efforts of creating a 
specialisation for prosecutors in sexual offences should be continued and 
intensified.
624
 At the moment special training for prosecutors dealing with 
sexual offences is offered by the SOCA Unit.
625
 But several obstacles have 
been identified that hinder the necessary establishment of specialised sexual 
offences prosecutors.
626
 For example, prosecutors working in sexual offences 
courts are not assigned to a specialised office, but fall under the authority of the 
                                                






 Thuthuzela Care Centres: The Country’s Anti-Rape Strategy improve Perpetrator 
Conviction Rates, available at: http://www.npa.gov.za/ReadContent407.aspx, accessed: 
01.02.2007. 
624
 Müller, K.D. and van der Merwe, I.A. ‘The sexual offences prosecutor: a new 
specialisation?’ (2004) Journal for Juridical Science Vol. 29, Issue 1, 135-151. 
625 NPA Annual Report 2005/06, p. 44. 
626
 Müller, Van der Merwe op cit (note 624), p.150. 
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NPA and operate therefore in the courts only on a rotational basis.
627
 Where 
they are permanently assigned to sexual offences courts, they are promoted to 
fast to the position of control and senior prosecutors.
628
 Finally, it is argued that 
currently prosecutors are not properly screened for ensuring that they have the 
necessary abilities to perform in sexual offences courts.
629
 
The problems identified resemble to some extent the problems in the 
prosecution service already discussed.
630
 In order to keep experienced 
prosecutors in the courts the above
631
 suggested measures are necessary to be 
implemented. In this regard the above given arguments apply as well. 
 
7. Witness protection   
Witnesses are, just as victims,
632
 central to the effective investigation and 
prosecution of crimes. Where witnesses are intimidated or threatened, they 
might refuse to testify and, in the worst case, guilty offenders have to be 
acquitted.  
On an international level witness protection is required by Article 24 of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
633
 In 
South Africa the Witness Protection Act No 122 of 1998
634
 provides for 
witness protection and stipulates the procedure in this regard. The 
responsibility for witness protections rests with the Witness Protection Unit 
(WPU) located in the NPA. The purpose of the WPU is to  
‘provide protection and support services to vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses and related persons in serious crimes in judicial proceedings 
so that they are able to provide essential evidence without fear or harm 
                                                
627 Ibid. 
628





631 IX.1.a), b). 
632
 The author is aware of the fact that victims have also a witness function in the investigation 
and prosecution of crimes.   
633
 United Nations, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, 
Article 24 par 1 requires that every signatory to  
‘take appropriate measures within its means to provide effective protection from 
potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses in criminal proceedings who give 
testimony concerning offences covered by this Convention and, as appropriate, for 
their relatives and other person close to them.’ 
634
 Hereinafter referred to as the Witness Protection Act. 
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The main strategic objectives of the WPU for this purpose are to ensure good 
governance in the WPU in order to provide appropriate services, to contribute 
to crime prevention and community justice, and to develop and enhance the 
WPU capability.
636
 The operating model of the WPU caters for 7 days a week 
and 24 hours a day operations.
637
 
In 2005/06 there were 220 witnesses and 268 family members of witnesses 
under the protection of the WPU.
638
 None of these people was harmed while 
being protected by the WPU.
639
 In the cases where protected witnesses testified 
the average conviction rate was 95%.
640
   
Putting these figures in context reveals two aspects. First, in the period of the 
last four years the number of witnesses protected by the WPU has considerably 
decreased by over 40%.
641
 The reason provided for this reduction is that 
budgetary constraints had the effect that posts had to be cut.
642
 Secondly, in the 
cases where the evidence of the 220 witnesses under protection was utilised 
383 life-term sentences were imposed, which was an increase in the period of 
the last four years by over 400%.
643
 The conclusion can be drawn that although 
the number of witnesses protected has decreased, the impact of the evidence 
provided by them has considerably increased. The high conviction of 95% 
underlines that witness protection pays.  
 
In terms of the Witness Protection Act protection may be granted to witnesses 
only if their testimony relates to cases involving serious offences, such as 
treason, sedition, murder, rape, robbery with aggravating circumstances and 
robbery involving the taking of a motor vehicle, kidnapping and drugs 
                                                
635
 NPA Annual Report 2005/06, p. 51. 
636
 Ibid, p. 51, 52. 
637
 http://www.npa.gov.za/ReadContent390.aspx, accessed 02.02.2007. 











trafficking, arms smuggling and fraud.
644
 Although the Director of Witness 
Protection has the discretion to grant protection to witnesses in respect of any 
other offence if he is of the opinion that the safety of the witness warrants it,
645
 
the circle of potential protected witnesses is somewhat restricted. The 
restriction can be justified as witness protection is expensive and the limited 
financial resources of the WPU have to be focused on the most important 
cases.  
But witness protection is not the only service that is required to secure that 
witnesses are going to testify.
646
 If one considers that every year more than a 
million cases
647
 are heard in South African courts than it becomes apparent that 
the witness protection programmes offered to 220 witnesses are only a very 
small contribution to ensure that witnesses are going to testify, as they can only 
cover high profile cases. A recently conducted survey indicates that the needs 
of witnesses go far beyond the service offered by protection programmes.
648
  
Although most witnesses (60%) felt intimidated by other people, such as the 
defendant or his lawyer, over a quarter of witnesses felt intimidated by the 
court environment and process, especially giving evidence and undergoing 
cross-examination.
649
 Only one third of witnesses who felt intimidated reported 
that to officials (mainly detectives and prosecutors) and only half of this third 
felt that officials dealt with this issue appropriately.
650
 
As a result of these findings it is argued in the literature that more attention 
must be given to support witnesses when they give evidence before court.
651
 
This requires training of court personnel and especially prosecutors to sharpen 
their sensibility for intimidating situations in the court process and to provide 
                                                
644
 Schedule attached to the Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998.  
645 Minnaar, A. ‘Witness Protection Programmes – Some Lessons from the South African 
Experience’ (2002) Acta Criminologica Vol. 15, Issue 3, 118-133, p. 123. 
646
 Bruce, D. ‘Danger, Threat of just Fear – Witness intimidation in three Gauteng courts’ SA 
Crime Quarterly No 13 September 2005, 23-28. 
647 Ibid, p. 23. 
648
 The CSVR witness satisfaction study was carried out in late 2003, covering 450 witnesses at 
three regional magistrates’ courts Gauteng. A high proportion of violent and other serious 
crimes are dealt with by South African courts are heard in the regional magistrates’ courts. 
Courts with a relatively high turnover of cases, one in Johannesburg, one in Soweto, and one in 
a black residential area on the East Rand, were selected for the study (Bruce op cit (note 646), 
p. 23, 24).   
649 Bruce op cit (note 646), p. 24 table 2, p. 26 table 3. 
650 Ibid, p. 26. 
651
 Ibid, p. 28. 
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them with the knowledge how to assist witnesses in these situations. Moreover, 
it is suggested that detectives and prosecutors should, in consultation with the 
witnesses, consistently evaluate cases in order to identify whether there is a 
danger of harm, or other intimidation, to the witness, and assess what steps are 
appropriate to protect the witness.
652
 Although this means further 
responsibilities for prosecutors, the outcome – a successful prosecution of an 
offender – should be worth it. Witness support requires that     
‘feelings of fear, and the concrete dangers facing many witnesses, need 
to be dealt with alongside the problems of frustration at remands and 
long hours spent waiting at court, the quality of facilities for witnesses, 




The challenge for the prosecution service can therefore be formulated as to 
consider that the needs of witnesses go beyond the service provided by witness 















                                                
652
 Ibid; one currently used measure to protect witnesses is to refuse bail where there is the risk 
that the accused may harm or interfere with the witness (Ibid). 
653
 Ibid, p. 28. 
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X. Conclusion 
The prosecutions service is a key role player in the criminal justice system. Its 
effectiveness and efficiency reflects on the performance and service of the 
whole criminal justice system.  
Although prosecutorial power has a long tradition in South Africa it was only 
as recently as 1998 that the current prosecution service was established. The 
constitutional and legislative provisions supplemented by the various policy 
papers have established a framework that in principle allows for an effective 
and efficient function of the prosecution service in the criminal justice system.  
Although the performance of the prosecution is with regard to some 
performance indicators improving, it is still insufficient. Several reasons can be 
identified that negatively impact on the prosecutorial performance. The NPA is 
aware of most of these problems. The current Annual Report strongly indicates 
that considerable measures have been taken to address the existing problems. 
The prosecution service is just as the whole South African society in a process 
of transformation. This is the main reason for the insufficient performance of 
the South African prosecution service. The measures taken need their time to 
show impact. For example, the recruitment of new prosecutors will only then 
positively influence the performance of the prosecution service when they have 
passed the aspirant trainings courses and gained experience in their work and 
remain in the prosecution service.      
But as the discussion of the challenges of the prosecution service indicates 
there is still a lot to do in order to boost prosecutorial performance. Further 
challenges of the prosecution services have been identified that improve the 
performance of the prosecution service but especially the service of the 
criminal justice system as a whole. That is the access to justice for victims and 
witnesses. 
 
Concerning the question whether the prosecution service is the linchpin of the 
criminal justice system the answer is therefore two folded:  
On the one hand, the performance of the prosecution service has improved over 
the last years and progress can be seen. But, on the other hand, the prosecution 
 98 
service is still not effective and efficient enough to cope with the high 
workload it is facing. Therefore it can be concluded that by nature the 
prosecution service has the potential to perform as the linchpin of the South 
African criminal justice system, but is currently still on its way to obtain this 
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